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PROSPECTUS EXEMPTIONS IN CANADA
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SUMMARY 
This paper examines the regime of prospectus exemptions in Canada. The focus is on 
the enforcement process, and to this end the article includes an empirical examination 
of enforcement actions by both the securities regulators and the Investment Industry 
Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC).
The end in view is two-fold; to provide a description of the exempt market and 
enforcement efforts, and to comment on whether enforcement resources are properly 
deployed. The latter necessarily requires a critical examination of the nature of the 
various exemptions, their purposes, and whether they are appropriately crafted to 
achieve their desired ends. That in turn requires an analysis of which issuers use 
the various exemptions, what types of securities are issued, and who the buyers 
are. Unfortunately, the Canadian data falls far short of painting a comprehensive or 
reliable picture of the exempt market.
This is a product of many factors. Notably, many exempt financings need not be 
reported to the regulators. Moreover, many small private companies do not report their 
exempt financings even when required to do so. The extent of the under-reporting 
problem (from both causes) is illustrated by data from Statistics Canada suggesting 
that in 2014, there were about 156,000 exempt financings across Canada. However, 
in that year, only about 7,125 exempt financing reports were filed with the regulators.
Understanding the nature of the exempt market is also hindered by the fact that 
not all of the provincial regulators compile statistics relating to the use of the 
various exemptions, and even among regulators that provide statistics, these are 
not published on an annual basis. Added to this, the published statistics that we 
have fall far short of painting a comprehensive or picture of the exempt market. 
The regulators do not compile cross-tabulated statistics relating to the nature of 
the issuers, the types of purchasers, the amount of capital raised, and the types of 
securities issued. Nor do they keep statistics on redemptions of prospectus-exempt 
securities, thus potentially yielding a material overstatement of the net amount of 
prospectus exempt financings each year.
The inability to comprehensively describe how the exempt market is used makes 
it difficult to determine if the exemptions are achieving their stated purposes, and 
in relation to exemptions that depart from a strict investor protection rationale and which are 
designed to address perceived capital gaps in the funding landscape. Appropriately crafting 
such exemptions requires a finely honed understanding of where and why capital gaps exist in 
the Canadian funding landscape, and the mechanisms by which these may be addressed. Such 
analysis, unfortunately, has been lacking.
Prospectus  exempt securities are mainly purchased by governments, institutions, corporations, 
and retail investors. Because retail investors possess a heterogeneous degree of investment 
knowledge and sophistication, the greatest investor protection issues are likely to arise in 
respect of such investors. These dangers may be mitigated by the involvement of a registrant 
in the purchase of an exempt security, since every registrant is charged with the duty to “know 
your client” and to make a judgment about the suitability of all client investments. Even in 
such cases, however, retail investors are not free from risk. As noted below, there are many 
enforcement cases in which retail investors (most often with the complicity of the registrant) 
misrepresent their qualifications on “know your client” forms and invest in securities with 
unsuitable risk/return characteristics. In addition, there is the danger that either the issuer or 
the registrant will misrepresent the risk/return characteristics of the exempt security to the 
retail buyer, again resulting in the purchase of an unsuitable investment.
enforcement proceedings almost invariably involve retail investors. Securities regulators, 
who typically hear cases involving non-registrants, tend to impose rigorous sanctions. 
Severe sanctions are amply justified in order to deter wrongdoing, particularly as many cases 
involving abuse of the prospectus exemptions by non-registrants likely go unreported and 
hence unremedied.
IIROC, which hears complaints involving registrants, tends to mete out less severe sanctions 
than the securities regulators. This gives rise to a concern that, because IIROC is funded by 
the investment industry, it has a tendency to be lenient on those who provide the financial 
of the fact that cases involving non-registrants (i.e. those heard by the securities regulators) 
tend to involve more serious conduct, particularly fraud. Further inquiry is indicated.
One of the most important results from the data is conspicuous by its absence: namely, 
disciplinary cases involving exempt market dealers (EMDs).  EMDs, which are permitted in all 
jurisdictions, may participate only in prospectus-exempt financings. Like investment dealers, 
they are impressed with KYC and suitability duties. However, unlike investment dealers, 
they are not required to belong to IIROC or any other SRO, and none exists for EMDs (who 
are regulated only by the securities regulators). Securities regulators should give serious 
consideration to requiring the creation of an SRO for EMDs.
There is a vast discrepancy in cost between prospectus financings and exempt financings 
for which there is no mandatory disclosure. The regulators have addressed this in part by 
exemption. However, the rules relating to the OM vary materially from province to province, 
realistic alternative for most multi-province issuers unless and until there are harmonized 
rules across the country. Alternatively, the OM could be made subject to the passport system, 
so that there is only one principal regulator for an OM issuance.
should inspire the regulators to give serious consideration to reducing the cost of a prospectus 
1I. INTRODUCTION
In Canada, the default rule is that when a business enterprise issues securities, it must put together 
a complex document known as a prospectus. A central motivation for the prospectus requirement is 
investor protection; i.e., it is assumed that without the complex disclosure found in the prospectus, 
investors will have an insufficient basis upon which to make sound and informed investment 
decisions. Another is to facilitate the achievement of allocative efficiency by ensuring that the funds 
of net savers are directed to the net users of capital that promise the best risk/return trade-offs.
Assembling a prospectus is an expensive and time-consuming exercise. A long-form prospectus 
(used for initial public offerings) will rarely be fewer than 50 pages, and can easily run to 200 
pages or more.1 The legal, audit and accounting costs for a small offering are typically in the range 
of $200,000 to $500,000; for a larger offering, $500,000 to $1 million or more.2 The typical IPO 
process will take approximately 100 days,3 and during this time senior management will be able to 
devote very little time to actually running the business (as opposed to meeting with and answering 
questions from lawyers, auditors, underwriters, regulators, etc., and participating in sales efforts).
Luckily, there are a host of exemptions from the prospectus requirement. The exemptions are 
filters that allow investors to purchase securities in primary market offerings without the benefit of 
a prospectus, on the theory that cases will arise in which a prospectus is not needed to effect the 
investor protection and allocative efficiency goals. Thus, the prospectus exemptions are a central 
feature of the investor protection regime in Canadian securities law.
The thrust of this paper is to examine how the prospectus exemptions are enforced in Canada. In 
order to do so, a host of intertwined issues come into play, including the following:
1. An examination of the efficacy of the exemptive scheme (and corresponding enforcement 
efforts) requires a review of when the various exemptions are used and by whom. I begin by 
reviewing the record.
2. In order to go beyond the merely descriptive, and to address the normative issue of whether 
the types and levels of enforcement are appropriate, it is necessary to examine whether the 
exemptions themselves are appropriately drawn to effect the investor protection (and allocative 
efficiency) goals. Thus, a considerable part of the paper is devoted to:
a) Enumerating the various rationales for the prospectus exemptions;
b) Classifying each exemption according to its underlying rationale(s);
c) Examining whether the different exemptions are properly crafted to achieve their 
underlying rationale(s);
d) Determining which exemptions are most likely to leave unresolved investor protection 
issues requiring relatively vigorous enforcement efforts.
3. Many investors purchase prospectus-exempt securities through the services of a registrant, or 
securities market professional; that registrant is typically subject to “know your client” (KYC) 
and “suitability” obligations. Understanding the efficacy of enforcement efforts thus requires a 
review of registrant-related enforcement initiatives.
The last part of the paper examines the breadth and scope of enforcement efforts by securities 
regulators, the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC), and the courts, 
and comments on the efficacy of these enforcement efforts. I find that in the main, enforcement 
1 
See e.g., the April 9, 2007 prospectus of Anaconda Gold Corporation (available on sedar.com) which runs to over 200 pages.
2 
See PWC, “Guide to Going Public in Canada,” (April 2014), available at https://www.pwc.com/ca/en/transaction-service/
publications/pwc-guide-going-public-canada-2014-05-en.pdf p. 27.
3 Ibid., 5.
2efforts are appropriately centred on problems that arise in relation to retail clients and registrants 
advising retail clients on the purchase of exempt market securities. A number of recommendations 
are made, including:
a) Regulators should make more vigorous efforts to achieve an empirical mapping of the 
exempt market;
b) While investor protection concerns are foremost in the design of most prospectus 
exemptions, some (such as the crowdfunding exemption and the rights-offering 
exemption) appear to compromise investor protection in order to facilitate capital raising 
in particular segments of the market or in relation to particular types of offerings. These 
are not based on any systematic attempt to determine where market gaps exist in the 
funding of Canadian enterprise. An inquiry of this nature would shed much light on the 
appropriateness of the existing exemptive regime;
c) The idea of investor protection is capable of bearing a number of different meanings. 
idea of fairness in securities markets. Efforts should be made to address these important 
issues;
d) A regulatory lacuna exists in the case of exempt market dealers (EMD), which (unlike 
other securities market professionals) are unregulated by any self-regulatory organization. 
Regulators should give consideration to requiring the creation of an SRO for EMDs and 
mandating certain supervisory responsibilities;
e) To resolve provincial differences in the prospectus exemptions, the regulators should 
consider adopting a mutual recognition system for prospectus exemptions. Failing this, 
a nationally coordinated effort should be made to produce a master chart indicating 
precisely which exemptions are available in which provinces;
f) Regulators should (as they now do) vigorously enforce the KYC and suitability obligations 
of registrants. Sanctions should be particularly severe in cases involving induced 
misrepresentation, in which the registrant encourages the client to misrepresent their KYC 
information on account documents in order to invest in exempt securities; 
g) Regulators should closely monitor the extent to which the new crowdfunding exemption is 
consistent with investor protection;
h) 
are prospectus-exempt raises the issue of whether the current prospectus disclosure 
requirements are excessive. Consideration should be given to further simplifying these 
disclosure requirements;
i) The sanctions meted out by IIROC tend to be less severe than those meted out by the 
securities regulators. There are a variety of potentially benign explanations for this result 
(such as the differential nature of the cases heard by IIROC and the securities regulators). 
number of registrants, trading activity and revenues)4 further examination is warranted to 
determine whether IIROC’s relative leniency is a function of its reluctance to sanction its 
own members.
4 IIROC, “IIROC History & FAQ,” available at http://www.iiroc.ca/about/ourroleandmandate/Pages/IIROC-History-FAQ.aspx#3 
3II. THE SPECTRUM OF EXEMPTIONS
Exemptions come in a variety of types. At one end of the spectrum are what might be styled the 
wholesale exemptions, which remove the prospectus requirement without substituting any other 
form of investor protection. The accredited investor exemption is an example. If the purchaser 
satisfies the definition of “accredited investor”, then that person may invest without hindrance in 
any issuer in any amount at any time.
Other exemptions might be styled the equivalence exemptions. These withhold the prospectus 
obligation while substituting informational requirements that essentially replicate the mandatory 
disclosure in a prospectus, or substitute an alternative suite of investor protection mechanisms. One 
example is the TSX Venture Exchange Offering Document (see Table 7), which essentially replicates 
prospectus disclosure. Another is the exemption for business combinations and reorganizations (also 
digested to Table 7), in which investors are protected by a combination of mechanisms including 
mandatory disclosure, shareholder votes and various forms of merit regulation.
Last, but certainly not least, there are a variety of hybrid exemptions. These relieve the issuer from 
the prospectus requirement but substitute one or more other investor protection mechanisms (which 
may include some quantum of mandatory disclosure), usually with a view to lowering the issuer’s 
financing costs while maintaining an acceptable level of investor protection. Many exemptions 
are of this variety, including the negotiable short-term paper and promissory note exemption,5 the 
rights offering exemption,6 the offering memorandum exemption7 and the crowdfunding exemption 
(the CF exemption).8
I first discuss what we know about the use of the prospectus exemptions. This discussion is 
helpful in determining where enforcement issues are likely to arise. I then discuss the rationale 
and empirical assumptions that lie behind the prospectus requirement and the exemptions. This 
too is an important ingredient in evaluating where enforcement resources should be concentrated. 
I next discuss the allocation of enforcement responsibilities among self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs), securities regulators and the courts, the types of cases that each hears, and the sanctions 
each metes out. Finally, I discuss the normative issue of whether enforcement resources are 
appropriately allocated.
III.  WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE MARKET FOR PROSPECTUS- 
EXEMPT SECURITIES?
A. Incompleteness of the Data
1. The Reporting Obligation Does Not Include All Exemptions
Although there are on the order of 50 national prospectus exemptions,9 exempt distributions need 
5 
NI 45-106, s.2.35.
6 
Ibid., s.2.1.
7 
Ibid., s.2.9.
8 
MI 45-108 (applying in Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia). In Manitoba, the pertinent instrument is 
Blanket Order 45-502 (“Start-up Crowdfunding Prospectus and Registration Exemption”); in Saskatchewan, General Order 
45-929 (“Start-up Crowdfunding Registration and Prospectus Exemptions”).
9 
The national exemptions are those agreed to and enacted in all provinces and territories. They are embodied in National 
Instrument (or NI) 45-106. In addition, many provinces and territories have jurisdiction-specific exemptions.
4only be reported in connection with 10 of these.10 Many of the most commonly used prospectus 
exemptions (such as the accredited investor exemption) give rise to reportable transactions. However, 
other important exemptions do not, such as the private issuer exemption, the negotiable short-term 
paper and promissory note exemption (widely used by financial institutions to raise large volumes of 
short-term money),11 the rights offering exemption and the institutional debt securities exemption.
2.  The TSX Venture Exchange Offering Exemption is Not a True  
Prospectus Exemption
While the TSX Venture Exchange offering12 is a reportable exemption, it is arguably not a true 
prospectus exemption. Rather, it is an alternative form of public offering for companies that are 
listed on the TSX Venture Exchange, utilizing a short-form prospectus not unlike that in a non-
exempt financing.13 While it is appropriate to make such offerings reportable, it is inappropriate to 
classify such offerings as exempt market offerings. Doing so obscures the size of both the Canadian 
public and private markets. 
3. The Under-Reporting Problem
Figures garnered from Ontario regulators and from Statistics Canada suggest that the vast bulk 
of exempt financings are not reported. Data from Ontario14 indicate that in the first eight months 
of 2014, about 3,800 exempt financing reports were filed by issuers other than investment funds. 
These exempt offerings raised a total of $41 billion. Thus, the average money raised per filed 
report was $10.8 million. These 3,800 reports represented a total of 22,000 purchases; the average 
purchase (per purchaser per report) was thus $1.86 million.15
These figures are telling. It is clear that issuers who report their financial transactions are very large 
issuers raising a very significant amount of capital. It also seems clear from the magnitude of the 
average purchase that most of the purchasers are institutional buyers.
Projected over 12 months, this suggests that about 5,700 reports were filed in the course of the 
entire year by issuers other than investment funds. Since about 80 per cent of Canada’s economic 
10 
In NI 45-106, these are:
 
(a) Accredited investor (NI 45-106, s.2.3);
 
(b) Family, friends and business associates (NI 45-106, ss.2.5, 2.6, 2.6.1);
 
(c) Offering Memorandum (until recently, not offered in Ontario) (NI 45-106, s.2.9);
 
(d) Minimum amount invested: Cash ($150,000) (NI 45-106, s.2.10);
 
(e) Minimum amount invested: Asset acquisition ($150,000) (NI 45-106, s.2.12);
 
(f) Petroleum, natural gas and mining properties (NI 45-106, s.2.13);
 
(g) Securities for debt (NI 45-106, s.2.14);
 
(h) Additional investment in investment funds (NI 45-106, s.2.19);
 
(i) Isolated distribution by issuer (NI 45-106, s.2.30);
 
(j) TSX Venture Exchange offering (NI 45-106, s.5.2).
 
In some cases, individual provinces have exemptions that are also subject to the reporting obligations (such as Ontario’s 
“government incentive security” exemption. See Ontario Securities Commission Rule 45-501, ss.2.1, 6.1.)
11 
Vijay Jog, “The Exempt Market in Canada: Empirics, Observations and Recommendations,” SPP Research Papers, The 
School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, March 2015, 10, 12 (note 45), 13, 18. Evidence presented in this paper 
supports this conclusion.
12 
TSXV Corporate Finance Policies, Policy 4.6, “Public Offering by Short Form Offering Document.” 
13 
See National Instrument 41-101, “General Prospectus Requirements,” and Companion Policy 41-101CP. 
14 
OSC “Backgrounder: Exempt Market Review,” Nov. 5, 2015, 6.
15 
A further 2,100 reports were filed by investment funds, raising $80 billion in total, or $38,100 per filing.
5activity occurs in Ontario, this suggests that in 2014 there would have been about 7,125 exempt 
financing reports filed in all of Canada, representing 41,250 individual purchases.
Data from Statistics Canada, however, suggest that these reported transactions constitute a 
small fraction of all exempt financings. Table 1 indicates that there are about one million active 
enterprises in Canada in any given year. Table 2 further indicates that approximately 60,000 to 
80,000 new enterprises are created each year.
TABLE 1 ACTIVE CANADIAN ENTERPRISES
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 2011 2012 2013
1-4 681,020 693,760 750,180
5-9 182,460 184,680 194,680
10-19 98,270 99,710 105,280
20-49 57,830 59,770 62,850
50-99 17,290 18,080 18,880
100-199 6,690 6,860 7,100
200-249 1000 1,020 1,060
250-499 1840 1,850 1,850
500-999 760 780 790
1000+ 790 750 750
TOTAL 1,047,940 1,067,260 1,143,430
Source: Statistics Canada, Table 529-0001: “Active enterprises with one or more employees, by North American Industry 
Classification System and enterprise size.”
TABLE 2 ENTERPRISE BIRTHS
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 2011 2012 2013
1-4 47,870 56,950 64,780
5-9 6,770 6,920 8,040
10-19 2,520 2,710 3,280
20-49 1,280 1,360 1,780
50-99 340 370 430
100-199 70 100 100
200-249 10 10 10
250-499 0 0 10
500-999 0 0 0
1000+ 0 0 0
TOTAL 58,870 68,420 78,430
Source: Statistics Canada Table 529-0002: “Employer enterprise births, by North American Industry Classification 
System and enterprise size annual (number).”
Not every enterprise will issue securities (e.g., those that are organized as sole proprietorships). 
Nonetheless, most enterprises issue securities as that term is defined in securities legislation, 
including partnership units, limited partnership units, shares and debt financing instruments.16 
Thus, the likelihood is that a large proportion of Canadian enterprises do in fact issue securities. 
16 See e.g., Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s.1 (definition of “security”). 
6If we assume that only 10 per cent of the stock of Canadian enterprises raise fresh funds via a 
prospectus-exempt financing in a given year, that entails 100,000 prospectus-exempt financings. If 
we further assume that 80 per cent of the approximately 70,000 enterprises created each year issue 
securities, that accounts for an additional 56,000 prospectus-exempt financings. Adding together 
the financings by existing and new enterprises yields a total of 156,000 exempt financings per 
year.17 While it is difficult to know if the same ratio of financings/individual investments observed 
in reported financings (5.79) applies, this would seem to be a defensible guess, yielding a total 
of 903,240 individual financings per year. Under this assumption, reported exempt investments 
account for only about 4.6 per cent of all exempt investments. 
4. Reporting Bias: Large Versus Small Issuers
Under-reporting is a product of two factors. First, not all exempt market financings are legally 
required to be reported. Second, even where there is a legal reporting requirement, it is not 
always observed.
In respect of financings that are reportable, the figures just quoted strongly suggest that such 
financings are dominated by large issuers selling securities to institutional investors. This in turn 
suggests that the under-reporting problem is concentrated in financings effected by small issuers 
that mainly sell securities to retail investors. This is not at all surprising. Large issuers are much 
more likely to have internal compliance departments and easy access to legal advice. They are also 
likely to be subject to relatively close monitoring by regulators. All of these factors lead to a high 
rate of regulatory compliance. By contrast, most small issuers do not have internal compliance 
departments or ready access to legal advice, and tend to operate under the radar of the regulators. 
They can thus be expected to have a relatively low rate of compliance.
Moreover, large issuers are much more likely to rely on reportable exempt financings than 
small issuers. Data presented below indicate that large issuers sell securities in relatively large 
distributions to a relatively small number of buyers (very likely institutional), and rely on the 
accredited issuer exemption — the use of which is reportable. Small firms, by contrast, sell 
securities in small distributions to retail buyers. Many of these financings will be effected under 
the private issuer exemption, which is not reportable. They may also be effected under the family, 
friends and business associates exemption (FFBA), which is reportable. However, the reporting 
obligation may be honoured more in the breach than the observance.
5. The Duration/Redemption Problem
Reported data on exempt financings do not indicate the duration of the financing, or when 
securities that are issued are redeemed or otherwise retired by the issuer. This leads to a tendency 
to overstate the size of the exempt market.18
This concern is particularly pertinent to investment funds that are in continuous distribution. In a 
given year, for example, an investment fund might report the issuance of $100 million of exempt 
securities. However, in the same year, the fund may have also retired $100 million in securities, 
for a net exempt financing of $0. Indeed, the fund’s net exempt financings would be negative if 
redemptions exceeded distributions.
17 
It may be that some of these new enterprises go public and raise funds through a prospectus offering. However, that number 
would be small. There are only slightly more than 4,000 listed public companies in Canada (approximately 4,000 on the 
TSX and the TSX-V, and about 300 on the Canadian Securities Exchange). More importantly, in any given year, there are at 
most several hundred newly listed companies. 
18 
Jog, 10-11, 13, 15.
7This concern is not merely theoretical: exempt financings by investment funds constitute about 
two-thirds or more of all reported financings by dollar value.19 The extent to which this problem 
leads to an overstatement of the size of the exempt market, however, remains unknown.
B. Empirical Assessments of the Exempt Market
The most comprehensive empirical assessments of the exempt market — based of course only on 
reported exempt financings — may be found in Jog (2015)20 and the OSC’s Exempt Market Review 
(2015).21 The primary findings of these studies are summarized below.
1. The Size of the Exempt Market
Jog’s data show that the exempt market is very large. While these data do not cover all provinces,22 
between 2010 and 2012 (inclusive), the total of all reported exempt financings in his sample 
amounted to $377 billion, or an average of about $125 billion per year. 
The OSC’s data — which cover only Ontario issuers — show the exempt market to be somewhat 
larger. In the first eight months of 2014, exempt financings totalled $121 billion. This equates to 
$181 billion on an annualized basis, which in turn (again assuming that Ontario represents 80 per 
cent of Canada’s capital market activity) yields a derived nation-wide market of about $227 billion 
per year.
2. Investment Funds versus Other Issuers
Jog’s Ontario-only data (Table 3) show that investment funds raised about three times more money 
via prospectus exemptions than did non-investment funds.
TABLE 3 INVESTMENT FUNDS VERSUS NON-INVESTMENT FUNDS
Ontario – Capital Raised by Investment Funds vs. Other 
(billions)
Year Investment Fund Non-Investment Fund Total % of national total
2012 67.24 37.13 104.37 75.14%
2011 59.01 27.54 86.55 70.46%
2010 52.74 25.83 78.58 67.90%
2009 54.95 14.74 69.69 N/A
2008 71.92 20.24 92.16 N/A
Source: Vijay Jog, “Exempt Markets in Canada – Empirics, Observations and Recommendations,” The School of Public 
Policy, University of Calgary, SPP Research Papers, vol. 8(10), March 2015, 13.
The OSC’s figures for 2014 confirm this general picture. Exempt financings by investment funds 
constituted $80 billion, or 67 per cent of the total. Thus, in this data set the ratio of investment fund 
offerings to non-investment fund offerings was two to one.23
19 
See note 18 and accompanying text.
20 
Jog.
21 
Ontario Securities Commission, “Backgrounder …” Appendix A.
22 
The data appear to include Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and New Brunswick.
23 
OSC “Backgrounder …” 6.
83. Relative Use of Different Exemptions
As Table 4 indicates, in Jog’s study the most widely used of all reportable exemptions, by two 
orders of magnitude, is the accredited investor exemption.24 Unfortunately, however, Jog was 
unable to parse the aggregate usage statistics by type of issuer, size of issuer or type of investor. 
TABLE 4 EXEMPT MARKET BY CAPITAL-RAISING EXEMPTIONS ($ BILLIONS)
2.3 - Accredited 
Investor
2.5 - Family, friends 
and business 
associates
2.9 - Offering 
Memorandum Other Unknown Total
2012 121.76 0.59 0.97 9.38 6.21 138.90
2011 86.93 0.35 0.55 6.69 28.30 122.83
2010 84.51 0.38 0.65 6.10 24.09 115.73
Total 293.20 1.32 2.17 22.17 58.60 377.45
Source: Vijay Jog, “Exempt Markets in Canada — Empirics, Observations and Recommendations,” The School of Public 
Policy, University of Calgary, SPP Research Papers, vol. 8(10), March 2015, 13.
The OSC’s statistics are similar. The OSC reports that, for non-investment fund issuers, “[t]he 
accredited investor exemption remained the most relied upon prospectus exemption by capital 
raised (92 per cent), filings (74 per cent) and purchases (64 per cent) in 2014.”25 
These figures indicate that, when compared to other exemptions, the accredited investor exemption:
a) Raised more capital per filing;
b) Raised more capital per purchase.
This lends credence to the view that the accredited investor exemption is dominated by large 
issuers raising relatively large amounts of money.
The statistics presented by Jog and by the OSC relate to dollar value, and not to number of offerings. 
It is likely that there are very many more small offerings by small firms than large offerings by 
large firms. This suggests that by number of offerings, rather than dollar value, the private issuer 
exemption and the family, friends and business associates exemption are likely to dominate.
In the OSC filings, the second most used exemption (again, by dollar value) was the $150,000 
exemption.26 It appears to have been used, however, in only about three per cent of the reported 
financings. 
4. Reporting Versus Non-Reporting Issuers
Jog’s data (Table 5) break out the reported data according to whether the issuer was a reporting or 
a non-reporting issuer. Over 2010-2012, non-reporting issuers raised over three times the amount 
of money raised by reporting issuers under the prospectus exemptions. The OSC reports a very 
comparable ratio of reporting to non-reporting issuers.27
24 
Jog, Table 1, 13.
25 
Ontario Securities Commission, “Summary of Key Capital Raising Prospectus Exemptions in Ontario,” Jan. 28, 2016, 3, 
available at https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4/ni_20160128_45-106_key-capital-prospectus-
exemptions.pdf) 
26 
In 2014, this exemption could be used by individuals in Ontario. This is no longer the case.
27 
The OSC report states (8): 
   Only about one-quarter of the capital raised by non-investment fund issuers in 2014 was raised by reporting issuers. Non-
reporting issuers represented the majority of issuers filing reports of exempt distribution with the OSC but this was more 
prominent among financial issuers (84%) than non-financial issuers (56%). Over half of the filings from non-financial 
reporting issuers involved issuers that were listed on the TSX Venture Exchange.
9TABLE 5 EXEMPT MARKET BY REPORTING AND NON-REPORTING ISSUERS
Capital Raised by Reporting Status ($billions)
 Canada
  Reporting Non-Reporting Unknown Total
2012  27.73  98.05  12.51  138.29 
2011  18.68  76.14  28.35  123.17 
2010  13.81  31.65  69.83  115.30 
 Capital Raised by Reporting Status (per cent)
  Reporting Non-Reporting Unknown Total
2012 20.05% 70.90% 9.05% 100.00%
2011 15.17% 61.81% 23.02% 100.00%
2010 11.98% 27.46% 60.57% 100.00%
Source: Vijay Jog, “Exempt Markets in Canada — Empirics, Observations and Recommendations,” The School of Public 
Policy, University of Calgary, SPP Research Papers, vol. 8(10), March 2015, 15.
If non-reporting issuers are subject to a serious under-reporting problem, these figures may greatly 
understate the extent to which exempt financings by non-reporting issuers dominate those by 
reporting issuers.
However, it is important to note that the universe of non-reporting issuers is far from homogeneous. 
It includes not only small commercial companies, but large investment funds that sell only to 
accredited investors, financial institutions and other issuers.
5. Security Type
There are few data available on what types of securities are issued under prospectus exemptions. 
Jog was only able to find data for a single year from Ontario and New Brunswick (Table 6). These 
data show that debt financings dominated equity financings by a factor of about four to one.
TABLE 6 TYPES OF SECURITIES
Capital Raised By Security Type – Non-investment Funds
  Debt Equity Other Unknown Total
2012 $billions 27.38 7.05 2.61 33.61 70.65
2012 percentage 38.75% 9.99% 3.69% 47.57% 100.00%
Source: Vijay Jog, “Exempt Markets in Canada — Empirics, Observations and Recommendations,” The School of Public 
Policy, University of Calgary, SPP Research Papers, vol. 8(10), March 2015, 15.
The OSC data indicate that slightly more than two-thirds (67 per cent) of capital raised in 
prospectus-exempt transactions was via debt financing, versus 26 per cent via equity, for a ratio of 
2.6 to one. The OSC data also show that debt financings were, on average, nearly five times larger 
than equity financings, and that debt financings were larger in both public and private markets.28 
28 
OSC Report, 7.
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6. Issuer Type
The OSC reports the following in regards to the types of issuers utilizing the prospectus 
exemptions:
a) Of all non-investment fund issuers, 40 per cent were “financials” (which includes, inter 
alia, “private equity firms, consumer credit securitization vehicles, banks, mortgage 
investment entities and insurance firms);29
b) “[O]n average financial issuers raised significantly more per offering from a smaller pool of 
investors”;30
c) “Issuers headquartered outside of Canada represented 50 per cent of filings by financial 
issuers in 2014. The majority of these foreign issuers are U.S.-based”;31
d) Among non-financial issuers, the energy and materials group accounted for 24 per cent of 
all funds raised; 
e) The balance, in order, were consumer (20 per cent); real estate (16 per cent); industrials (14 
per cent); tech, media and telecom (13 per cent); and other (13 per cent).
7. Amount Raised Per Filing
In respect of the amounts raised, the OSC reports a great deal of heterogeneity in fund-raising 
activity:
FIGURE 1 OSC DATA ON AMOUNTS RAISED
 
Source: Ontario Securities Commission, “Backgrounder — Exempt Market Review,” Nov. 5, 2015
Figure 1 shows that a large number of filings were associated with small raises of capital, while a 
small number of financings were associated with large raises of capital. Unfortunately, the OSC 
report does not indicate the nature of the issuers engaging in small and large financings.
29 
Ibid., 5.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 9.
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8. Summary
Understanding the nature of the exempt market is important to understanding where enforcement 
problems are likely to arise and where enforcement resources should be directed. The data that we 
have are certainly useful. However, the data are also very incomplete and possibly quite misleading 
in some respects. Without cross-tabulations of the data, it is very difficult to get more than a 
general sense of the nature and extent of the exempt market.
Based on reported data, however, the following facts seem to emerge:
a) By dollars raised, investment funds are the largest users of the prospectus exemptions;
b) The accredited investor exemption is used far more often than any other exemption;
c) By dollars raised, non-reporting issuers exceed reporting issuers by a factor of about three 
to one;
d) Debt securities are issued approximately three or four times more often than equity securities;
e) Of non-investment fund issuers, 40 per cent are financial issuers, and these issuers raise large 
amounts of money from a small number of investors;
f) The users of the prospectus exemptions are highly heterogeneous, by type of issuer, size of 
issuer, industry of issuer, reporting issuer status, type of security issued and type of investor.
C.  Significance of the Market Empirics for Enforcement Issues Related to 
Prospectus Exemptions
It would appear that by dollars raised, the exempt market dwarfs the public market. Obviously, 
for private companies, the exempt market represents the only market in which issuers may raise 
money. Even for public companies, exempt market financings are a vital source of capital. Former 
TSX Venture Exchange president John McCoach stated:32
We [i.e., the TSX Venture Exchange] found that of the estimated $6 billion raised by TSX-V 
issuers in 2012, approximately $4 billion was raised on a prospection-exempt/private placement 
basis. Of the 1,844 non-IPO financings … 1,719 (93 per cent) of these were completed on a 
prospectus-exempt/private placement basis. 
In a similar vein, Jog states: 
As can be seen above [in Table 6], the amounts raised through equity instruments in the exempt 
market were $7.05 billion in 2012. This can be compared with $4.8 billion and $1.2 billion raised 
on the TSX under initial public offerings in 2010 and 2011 respectively; $1.5 billion each raised 
by venture capital in 2010 and 2011; and $24 billion raised by TSX-listed companies through 
subsequent equity offerings in the same two years. Needless to say, the exempt market plays a 
significant role in Canadian equity markets, but most financing occurs through debt instruments.
These figures are startling and illustrate the foundational importance of the prospectus exemptions 
to the health of Canadian corporate enterprise and the Canadian economy. They also illustrate the 
importance of enforcement efforts. Overzealous enforcement efforts may undermine the economic 
function of the prospectus exemptions. On the other hand, given the size of the exempt market, 
under-enforcement may present great peril to investors.
The empirical record is useful in directing our attention to those sectors of the exempt market that 
are most likely to present enforcement issues. That is discussed below, but only after exploring:
32 
Harry Jaako, “Sinking Northwest Exemption Threatens Start-Up Survival in B.C.,” Business in Vancouver, March 2013. 
https://www.biv.com/article/2013/3/sinking-northwest-exemption-threatens-start-up-surv/ .
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a) The empirical assumptions that underlie both the prospectus requirement and the 
prospectus exemptions;
b) The regulatory rationales for the prospectus exemptions;
c) The types of investors who tend to use the various different prospectus exemptions.
IV. THE RATIONALES UNDERLYING THE PROSPECTUS REQUIREMENT
The various securities regulatory statutes in Canada (and the rules adopted by securities regulators) 
specify that any issuer seeking to sell a security must assemble a prospectus for the benefit of 
prospective buyers. This document offers a great deal of information regarding the issuer and 
its business, including audited financial statements, off-balance sheet financing, material risk 
factors, the competitive environment in which the issuer operates, the market in which the issuer’s 
securities will trade, the nature of the securities to be issued, the identities and backgrounds of 
directors and senior managers and their remuneration, related party transactions, and so on.
A number of empirical assumptions lie behind the prospectus requirement:
a) Issuers, left to their own devices (i.e., not confronted with mandatory disclosure laws 
applicable to primary market offerings) will fail to disclose all of the information that 
potential investors need in order to properly price the offering (the non-disclosure problem);33
b) Without mandated disclosure, investors will not be capable of properly evaluating the risk/
return trade-offs posed by different investment offerings, and hence determining a fair price 
(the pricing problem);
c) There is a significant cohort of investors who are incapable of properly assessing their own 
ability to determine a fair price for an offering, who, if left to their own devices, are at risk 
of investing in unsuitable securities.
By itself, the non-disclosure problem is not troubling if investors can arrive at an unbiased estimate 
of the true worth of an offering based not only on what is disclosed, but on what is not disclosed.34 
Non-disclosure creates risk for prospective buyers, particularly as issuers have an incentive to 
disclose good information and withhold bad information. Indeed, poorer quality issuers are more 
likely than high quality issuers to engage in non-disclosure, since full disclosure will have a 
particularly negative impact on the price at which they will be able to sell their securities.
Unfortunately, if most or all issuers withhold disclosure of particular items of information that are 
useful in pricing an offering, it will be difficult for investors, ex ante, to distinguish high quality 
issuers from low (particularly in connection with IPOs, where the issuer has no public track 
record). This potentially creates an adverse selection dynamic in which prospective buyers draw 
highly negative inferences, in relation to all issuers, from non-disclosures. This adverse selection 
has the effect of inefficiently raising the cost of capital for high quality issuers.
High quality issuers have potential ways of addressing the adverse selection dynamic, however. The 
most obvious is effecting full disclosure of all items that buyers are likely to believe are important 
in pricing an offering. Another is by crafting corporate governance arrangements in a manner that 
empowers investors to monitor and discipline the managers effectively. Such merit- based strategies 
qualify as signals, in the manner in which that term is used in the finance literature, since they are 
prospectively less expensive for high quality firms than low.
33 
Presumably, investors would prefer that the issuer disclose a particular item of information if the marginal cost of disclosure 
is equal to or less than the marginal benefit derived from disclosure.
34 
It is not necessary that all investors be able to perform appropriate discounting. All that is needed is that the marginal 
investors are sufficiently savvy to do so (e.g., institutional investors).
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If signalling works effectively, and prospective buyers are unbiased discounters, all offerings will be 
correctly priced no matter what the level of disclosure, and there is no need for mandatory disclosure.
It is for this reason that the second assumption noted above is needed to justify the prospectus 
requirement; that is, that investors are not capable of evaluating non-disclosure risk in an accurate, 
unbiased fashion. 
This arguably introduces a certain element of schizophrenia into the justification for mandated 
disclosure. An implicit assumption that lies behind mandated disclosure is that investors can 
appropriately evaluate items of information that are disclosed. However, if this is true, why are they 
not capable of evaluating the risks attendant upon non-disclosure? This seems to posit that investors 
are at once both sophisticated and unsophisticated.
The above arguments regarding the efficacy of mandated disclosure can be recast in terms of 
market efficiency. In an informationally efficient market, prospective investors are able to arrive 
at an unbiased estimate of the true worth of the securities offered based on all publicly known 
risks. Thus, the issuer bears the entire cost of inadequate disclosure. For this reason, the issuer has 
an incentive to provide investors with disclosure up to the point at which the marginal benefit of 
disclosure equals the marginal cost. Whether or not issuers actually do so, however, all offerings 
are a fair game insofar as, ex ante, they are correctly priced; all risks are appropriately discounted. 
This means that, ex post, on average, investor expectations are not disappointed. Thus, regulators 
need insist on neither mandatory disclosure to protect investors nor merit-based rules (i.e., all rules 
that require the issuer to do something other than simply disclose particular items of information, 
such as corporate governance requirements, or the imposition of mandatory escrow requirements 
on the occurrence of an IPO). 
V. THE RATIONALES UNDERLYING THE PROSPECTUS EXEMPTIONS
A. Introduction
In the section that follows, I discuss the manifold rationales that underlie the exemptions, the 
empirical assumptions that underpin these rationales, and various problems that may detract from 
the efficiency of the exemption or raise investor protection issues. There are a wide variety of 
rationales (and more than is commonly supposed). All are digested in Table 7.
Historically, a plurality of prospectus exemptions in Canada has been based on the goal of 
investor protection. However, recent exemptions such as the CF and rights offering exemptions 
aim at addressing perceived gaps in the funding landscape, subject to some minimum investor 
protection threshold. 
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TABLE 7 PROSPECTUS EXEMPTIONS AND THEIR RATIONALES
“x” ((where x is a number) refers to the number of different versions of the exemption across the country
“MD” means mandatory disclosure is required
“MR” means that there is accompanying merit regulation
“R” means that the issuer must report the exempt financing to the regulator
GENERIC SAFE 
SECURITIES
SAFE SECURITIES 
 
SPECIAL 
SITUATIONS 
PRESENTING 
LITTLE RISK TO 
INVESTORS
SPECIAL 
SITUATIONS 
PRESENTING 
SPECIFIC  RISKS TO 
INVESTORS THAT 
ARE ADDRESSED 
BY MANDATORY 
DISCLOSURE 
AND/OR MERIT 
REGULATION
SOPHISTICATION ACTIVE 
PARTICIPANTS
CLOSE 
CONNECTIONS
OTHER PROTECTIVE 
MECHANISMS (i.e. 
EQUIVALENCE 
EXEMPTIONS)
CAPITAL GAPS: 
PRIVATE ISSUERS
CAPITAL RAISING: 
PUBLIC ISSUERS
ALTERNATIVE 
DISCLOSURE 
REGIMES
POLICY DRIVEN ISOLATED 
DISTRIBUTION
GOVERNMENT 
DEBT SECURITIES 
-45-106, s.2.34(2)
(a)-(c) (except 
Ontario), (e)) 
SUPRANATIONAL 
AGENCY DEBT 
SECURITIES 
-45-106, s.2.34(2)(f)
INSTITUTIONAL 
DEBT SECURITIES 
-45-106, s.2.34 
-2 [ROC: Canadian 
financial institutions 
(2.34(2)(d) 
-ONTARIO: OSA 
ss.73(1), (2) and 
73.1(1), (2) and 45-
160, s.2.34 (2)(d.1)]
CONVERSION, 
EXCHANGE, OR 
EXERCISE 
-45-106, s.2.42 
-distribution of 
a security of the 
issuer (or of a 
reporting issuer) 
in accordance 
with the terms and 
conditions of a 
security previously 
issued by that issuer 
-1
RRSP/RRIF/TFSA 
-45-106 s.2.40 
-1
SELF-DIRECTED 
REGISTERED 
EDUCATIONAL 
SAVINGS PLAN 
-45-106, s.2.43 
-distribution of a 
self-directed RESP 
to a subscriber 
-2 (ON;ROC) 
-MR (distribution 
must be conducted 
by certain entities)
NEGOTIABLE 
SHORT-TERM 
COMMERCIAL 
PAPER  AND 
PROMISORY NOTES 
-45-106, ss. 2.35, 
2.35.1, 2.35.2, 
2.35.3  
-non-convertible 
unsecuritized and 
securitized short 
term debt 
-MR (credit ratings) 
-MD (securitized 
debt; information 
circular at outset, 
monthly reporting, 
timely disclosure 
reports) 
-1 
-R
CONTROL BLOCK 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
BY INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS 
-45-106, s.4.1 
-1 
-MD (advance 
notice) 
-MR
ACCREDITED 
INVESTOR 
-45-106, s.2.3 
-3 (Ontario, PEI (NI 
45-106, s.2.3(2)), 
ROC) 
-R
NOTE: Ontario’s 
accredited investor 
exemption is 
embodied in part 
in the Ontario 
Securities Act, 
s.73.3(2), rather 
than in NI 45-106
$150,000 CASH 
EXEMPTION 
-45-106, s.2.10 
-consideration paid 
for securities is no 
less than $150,000 
in cash 
-no longer available 
to individuals 
-1 
-R
PRIVATE ISSUER 
-45-106, s.2.4 
-private issuer 
-2 (Ontario, ROC)  
-MR
PRIVATE ISSUER 
-45-106, s.2.4 
-private issuer 
-2 (Ontario, ROC)  
-MR
INCENTIVE 
COMPENSATION 
PLANS 
-45-106, ss. 2.24-
2.29 
-incentive 
compensation plans 
-directors, officers, 
employees, 
consultants 
-2.26-2.29 deal 
with transfers of 
incentive securities 
back to issuer, and
between permitted 
persons 
-2 (slight variation 
for Manitoba 
permitted 
transferees) 
-MR for 
reporting issuers 
(participation must 
be voluntary) 
-more extended MR 
for non-reporting 
issuers
TSX VENTURE EX-
CHANGE OFFERING 
DOCUMENT 
-45-106, s.5.1 
-1 
-MD 
-MR 
-R
BUSINESS  
COMBINATIONS AND 
REORGANIZATIONS 
-45-106, s.2.11 
-business  
combinations and 
reorganizations 
(amalgamation, 
merger,  
reorganization, 
arrangement,  
dissolution,  
winding-up) 
-1
TAKEOVER AND 
ISSUER BIDS 
-45-106, s.2.16 
-1
FAMILY, FRIENDS, 
AND BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATES 
-45-106, ss.2.5, 2.6 
(Saskatchewan), 
2.6.1 (Ontario) 
-3 (Ontario, 
Saskatchewan, 
ROC) 
-MR 
-R
ACCREDITED 
INVESTOR 
-45-106, s.2.3 
-3 (Ontario, PEI (NI 
45-106, s.2.3(2)), 
ROC) 
-R
CROWDFUNDING 
-MI 45-108 
(Manitoba, 
Ontario, Québec, 
New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, 
Saskatchewan) 
-3 (Quebec; Ontario; 
ON/NB/NS) 
-MD 
-MR
RIGHTS OFFERING 
TO EXISTING 
SECURITY 
HOLDERS BY 
REPORTING ISSUER 
-45-106, s.2.1 
-issuance of rights 
by reporting issuer 
-1 
-MD 
-extensive MR
OFFERING 
MEMORANDUM 
-45-106, s.2.9 
-3 (BC + NL; MAN, 
NT, NUN, PEI, YT; 
AL, NB, NS, ON, 
QUE, SASK 
-many individual 
province 
requirements
-MD 
-MR 
-R
NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
ISSUER 
-45-106, s.2.38 
-non-profit issuer 
that is organized 
exclusively for 
educational, 
benevolent, 
fraternal, charitable, 
religious 
or recreational 
purposes 
-1 
-MR (no commission 
paid)
ACQUISITION 
OF PETROLEUM, 
NATURAL GAS, OR 
MINING PROPERTY 
-45-106, s.2.13 
-consideration paid 
is petroleum, natural 
gas, or mining 
property 
-1 
-R
ISOLATED 
DISTRIBUTION 
-45-106, s.2.30 
-1 
-R
15
REINVESTMENT 
PLANS 
-45-106, ss.2.2 
and 2.18 
-issuer reinvestment 
plan (2.2 re 
non-investment 
fund, and 2.18 re 
investment fund) 
-1 
-MR
SETTLEMENT OF 
ISSUER DEBT 
-45-106, s.2.14 
-consideration paid 
is debt of issuer 
-1 
-R
CONTROL BLOCK 
SALES INTO 
TAKEOVER BIDS  
-45-106 s.4.2 
-1 
-MD 
-MR
ADDITIONAL 
PURCHASES OF  
SECURITIES IN AN 
INVESTMENT FUND 
-45-106, s.2.19 
-additional 
purchasers of 
investment fund 
-investor initially 
paid $150,000 or 
more (and holds 
securities in fund 
with net asset value 
of $150,000) 
-1 
-R
INVESTMENT 
CLUBS 
-45-106, s.2.20 
-distribution of 
securities of an 
investment club to 
its members 
-1 
-MR
CROWDFUNDING 
-MI 45-108 
(Manitoba, 
Ontario, Québec, 
New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, 
Saskatchewan) 
-4 (Ontario; 
Quebec; New 
Brunswick, Nova 
Scotia, Ontario; all 
others) 
-MD 
-MR 
-R
$150,000 ASSETS 
EXEMPTION 
-45-106, s.2.12 
-consideration paid 
for securities  is no 
less than $150,000 
in assets 
-1 
-R
INVESTMENT 
FUNDS 
ADMINISTERED 
BY A TRUST 
CORPORATION 
-45-106, s.2.21 
-2 (trust corporation 
cannot be registered 
in PEI)
MORTGAGE 
BROKER/DEALERS 
-45-106, s.2.36 
-3 (ON; ALTA, BC, 
MAN, QUE, SASK; 
ROC)
SECURED DEBT 
REGISTERED 
UNDER PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 
SECURITY 
LEGISLATION 
-45-106, s.2.37 
-2 (ON; ROC)
VARIABLE 
INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS 
-45-106, s.2.39 
-1 
-MR 
 
BANK DEPOSITS 
-45-106, s.2.41
GOVERNMENT 
INCENTIVE 
SECURITY 
(ONTARIO) 
-Ontario Rule 45-
501, s.2.1
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It is worthwhile noting that the prospectus requirement applies not only to primary market 
transactions, but to a number of secondary market transactions as well. This includes sales of 
securities out of a control block,35 sales of securities that are subject to a hold period,36 and in some 
cases secondary sales by the issuer’s shareholders in conjunction with an IPO.37 Both primary and 
secondary market prospectus exemptions are discussed below.
B. Proxy Slippage
It is impossible for the rules governing prospectus exemptions to determine, in respect of 
individual distributions, whether the rationale that underlies the particular exemption is met or not. 
Functionality demands that all exemptions use proxies of one kind or another. Thus, for example, 
prospectus exemptions based on investor sophistication eschew individualized judgments in favour 
of the use of proxies for sophistication. In like fashion, prospectus exemptions based on the idea 
that certain securities are generically safe use proxies to identify low-risk securities. 
Determining the accuracy of these proxies is important in identifying situations in which 
enforcement issues are likely to occur. Where the proxy is highly accurate, it may be said that there 
is little proxy slippage. Conversely, if the proxy is highly imperfect and subject to wide confidence 
intervals, there is a high level of proxy slippage.
The idea of proxy slippage can be expressed in terms of a widely applied statistical construct — the 
likelihood of type I and type II errors. A type I error involves the rejection of a null hypothesis 
when it is in fact true (a false positive), while a type II error involves the failure to reject a null 
hypothesis that is false (a false negative).
Type I and type II errors implicate regulatory costs of a rather different nature. Generally speaking, a 
type I error will lead to investments being permitted in inappropriate circumstances. In the case of a 
sophistication proxy, for example, a type I error consists of recognizing a purchaser as sophisticated 
(and hence able to purchase exempt market products) when this is not in fact the case. Errors of this 
nature lead to a poor matching of investors to investments. This is likely to result in many investor 
complaints and hence the deployment of a non-trivial level of regulatory and judicial resources.
By contrast, type II errors prohibit investments from being made in circumstances where there is 
no good reason to do so. For example, in the case of a sophistication proxy, a type II error consists 
of rejecting the hypothesis of sophistication when the investor is in fact sophisticated. This type 
of error thus prevents investments from being made, resulting in a relatively modest deployment 
of regulatory and judicial resources. It is thus tempting to conclude that the natural tendency of 
regulators is to craft the prospectus exemptions in such a way as to produce significantly more 
type II than type I errors — i.e., with excessive investor protection. This will not only economize 
on budget and workload, but will also minimize the likelihood of regulatory reputational loss 
associated with investment scandals.
From an economic standpoint, both type I and type II errors result in allocative inefficiency, but 
by different means and with different consequences. Type I errors result in a mismatch between 
investors and investments. Type II errors prevent investments from being made — also resulting in 
allocative inefficiency — but without the potentially severe adverse distributional consequences for 
35 
The definition of “distribution” in OSA ss.1(1) includes “a trade in previously issued securities of an issuer from the 
holdings of any control person”; see also NI 45-106 s.4.1. The assumption that lies behind presumptively requiring a 
prospectus for the sale of control-person securities is that such persons may have access to inside information.
36 
See generally NI 45-102. It also includes transfers of securities from a person to that person’s RRSP (where the transfer 
would constitute a “distribution”, as in the case of a control person); NI 45-106 s.2.40.
37 
Sales by a variety of insiders in conjunction with an IPO are sometimes subject to mandatory escrow periods; see NI 46-201 
(“Escrow for Initial Public Offerings”). The escrow can be circumvented by qualifying the shares for sale in the IPO.
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investors that often accompany type I errors. This suggests that the regulatory bias should in fact 
be on producing a higher number of type II than type I errors. A contrary factor, however, is that 
excessive investor protection may have economy-wide ramifications by depriving small firms of 
growth opportunities, leading to a dearth of innovation and a depleted supply of acorns to mature 
into large oaks. Clearly, further inquiry is warranted.
C. Repeat Players
An efficient securities market is a fair game (as that term is used by financial economists) in the 
sense that, on average, investors’ expectations of return are exactly met (even though, in individual 
cases, actual returns may substantially depart from these expectations). The concept may be 
applied to both primary and secondary markets. In respect of secondary market purchases, the 
market is a fair game when the public trading prices of various issuers’ securities fully reflect 
investors’ risk-adjusted expectations of return. In the case of an individual primary market offering, 
the distribution is a fair game if the offering price achieves the same result.
Investors who are repeat players in particular types of primary market offerings benefit from a 
learning process. That is, by effecting iterations of primary market purchases, these investors can 
systematically compare ex ante expectations with ex post returns for particular types of primary 
market offerings. If the latter fall short of the former, these repeat players will presumably adjust their 
minimally acceptable terms of trade and communicate these to issuers, either directly (as where the 
offering is negotiated) or indirectly (by refusing to purchase an offering at the price offered).
The existence of repeat players is thus a potent investor protection mechanism, particularly if the 
repeat players are the marginal players responsible for setting the price of an offering of securities 
(via their willingness or unwillingness to purchase at a given price).
D. “Take It or Leave It” versus Negotiated Offerings
Where there is direct negotiation between the issuer and potential investors, both the quantity and 
quality of information conveyed to the issuer about its proposed offering will improve. This raises 
the likelihood that the offering will satisfy the fair game criterion.
E. The Safe Securities Rationale
1. Generic Categories of Safe Securities
Certain categories of securities are judged to be sufficiently safe that the vendor need not assemble 
a prospectus for prospective buyers. This includes, for example:
a) “A debt security issued by or guaranteed by the Government of Canada or the government 
of a jurisdiction of Canada”;38
b) “A debt security issued by or guaranteed by a government of a foreign jurisdiction if the 
debt security has an approved credit rating from an approved credit rating organization”.39
Other exemptions based on this rationale are indicated in Table 7.
The empirical assumption that drives the safe securities rationale is simple: these securities 
possess very little risk to investors. Hence, even without mandated disclosure, investors (whether 
sophisticated or not) will not be prejudiced by their purchase. The safe securities rationale is thus 
38 
NI 45-106, s. 2.34(2)(a).
39 
Ibid., (2)(b).
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properly digested under the investor protection goal of securities regulation, since it assumes that 
investors purchasing low-risk securities do not require mandated disclosure.
The safe securities rationale generates relatively little danger of type I errors. A type I error 
consists of identifying a government security as safe when in fact it is not. The danger of type I 
errors seems minimal; i.e., most government securities that are identified by the rules as safe are in 
fact low-risk securities that pose little danger to investors. 
In this case, a type II error consists of accepting the idea that government securities are not safe, 
when in fact they are. However, under existing rules, the proxy for safety is cast sufficiently wide 
that the danger of a type II error seems small. Overall, then, there is little danger of proxy slippage.
Governmental issuers dominate the safe securities category of prospectus exemption, and the bulk 
of these securities are sold to institutional investors who are savvy repeat players (in the context 
of an internationally competitive market where governments are price-takers rather than price-
makers). This too emphasizes the minimal danger to investors.
2.  Safe Securities or Types of Distributions: Special Situations Presenting Little 
Risk to Investors
There are a number of special situations digested in Table 7 in which there is little risk to the 
investors to whom securities are sold, including a number of both primary and secondary market 
distributions. In the former category, for example, is the conversion of one security into another, 
where the conversion privilege has been previously granted to the investor.40 In the latter category 
falls the distribution of a security by an investor into that investor’s RRSP.41
As in the case of generically safe securities, these prospectus exemptions are based on the investor 
protection rationale. Also, there seems to be little danger of type I or type II errors.
F. The Sophistication Rationale
1. Introduction
The most widely used prospectus exemptions (at least, among reported exemptions) are the 
sophistication exemptions, which are based on the empirical assumption that some investors are 
sufficiently sophisticated that they do not require the benefit of mandatory disclosure. The accredited 
investor exemption, which is supported by the sophistication rationale, is easily the most widely used 
of all exemptions. The second most widely used exemption — the minimum investment exemption 
— is also based (whether justified or not) on the idea of sophistication (i.e., any investor who can 
invest the minimum amount, or $150,000, in a single investment must be sophisticated).42 
However, securities law uses different proxies for sophistication for different types of investors. 
Separate proxies apply to institutional investors, retail investors, securities market professionals, 
corporations and governments.
In this case, the hypothesis is that investor X is sophisticated. A type I error thus occurs when an 
investor is identified as sophisticated, when he/she is not. A type II error consists of concluding that 
investor X is not sophisticated, when he/she is in fact sophisticated.
40 
Ibid., s.2.42.
41 
Ibid., s.2.40.
42 
Recently, Ontario has revoked the use of the minimum amount exemption for retail investors.
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2. Low Risk of Proxy Slippage: Institutional Investors
With some types of investors, the degree of proxy slippage is likely to be modest. An obvious case 
is that of institutional investors, which routinely qualify as accredited investors and hence may 
purchase securities without the benefit of a prospectus.43 Securities law specifies a long list of types 
of institutions that qualify as accredited investors. Any institution not fitting one of the categories 
may nonetheless qualify as an accredited investor if it has more than $5 million in net assets.44 
While some of these institutions may not be sophisticated, the likelihood of a type I error seems 
small. Since few classes or types of institutional investors are excluded, the likelihood of a type II 
error is also small.
In addition, the costliness of mistakes is mitigated by the fact that institutional investors typically 
have the diversification and financial resources to withstand individual investment losses. This 
obviously has important implications for the deployment of enforcement resources, since securities 
purchased by institutional investors are rarely likely to present investor protection issues.
The likelihood of both type I and type II errors also seems small for three other categories of 
accredited investors: investment professionals,45 corporations that qualify as accredited investors,46 
and governments and governmental entities.47 Like institutional investors, these investors are likely 
to be sophisticated and to possess the resources to withstand losses.
3. High Risk of Proxy Slippage: Retail Investors
a. Type I and Type II Errors; Trade-offs
The biggest problems with proxy slippage arise in connection with retail investors, who may 
qualify as accredited investors based on net income, net financial assets or net assets.48 The 
investor’s sophistication in these cases ostensibly arises either because the investor is experienced 
and knowledgeable, or because he/she has the means to hire professional investment advisors.
This proxy for sophistication is much more likely to be inaccurate than the other proxies noted 
above. Persons of means may or may not be sophisticated investors, and may or may not hire 
sophisticated advisors. Thus, the likelihood of a type I error is material. Such errors expose 
investors to the risk of purchasing unsuitable investments. Investors whom the rules falsely identify 
as sophisticated are at risk of being enticed by negligent or unscrupulous issuers or investment 
advisors to put their money in unsuitable investments. This can lead to a host of enforcement issues 
(and economic loss).
Type I errors have a variety of solutions (all based on the assumption that the problem, and 
therefore the solutions apply only to retail investors). These are indicated in Table 8.
43 
NI 45-106, s.1.1 (definition of “accredited investor”). Qualifying entities are financial institutions (which include a “bank, 
loan corporation, trust company, trust corporation, insurance company, treasury branch, credit union, caisse populaire, 
financial services co-operative, or league) (part (a)); the Business Development Bank of Canada (part (b)); investment 
dealers (part (d)), pension funds (part (i)), private investment funds distributing only to accredited investors or non-
individuals who purchase units costing at least $150,000 (part (n)), registered charities that are professionally advised (part 
(r)), and investment funds that are professionally advised (part u)).
44 
Ibid., para. 1.1 (definition of “accredited investor”, part (m)).
45 
Ibid., s.1.1 (definition of “accredited investor”, parts (d), (e), (e.1)).
46 
Corporations may qualify as accredited investors in two circumstances: where the corporation has net assets of at least $5 
million (NI 45-106, s.1.1 (definition of “accredited investor”, part (m))), and where all of the beneficial owners are accredited 
investors (NI 45-106, s.1.1 (definition of “accredited investor”, part (t))).
47 
NI 45-106, s.1.1 (definition of “accredited investor”, parts (f), (g), (h)).
48 
Ibid., (j)–(l).
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TABLE 8 SOPHISTICATION PROXIES AND TYPE I ERRORS
REGISTRANT NOT INVOLVED REGISTRANT INVOLVED
Properly Qualified Accredited Investor but 
Unsuitable Investment
• Eliminate non-brokered offerings by requiring, 
either in all cases or in relation to relatively risky 
offerings, that a registrant impressed with a duty 
of suitability be involved
• Impose suitability obligation on the issuer
• Raise the threshold for retail accredited investors
• Set investor qualifications for non-brokered 
offerings higher than for brokered offerings
• Impose severe penalties for issuer 
misrepresentations
• Vigorous enforcement of KYC/suitability duties
Non-Qualified Retail Investor Misrepresented as 
Qualified Investor 
• Strict onus on issuer to ensure that investor is 
qualified
• Strict onus on dealer to ensure that investor  
is qualified
• Vigorous enforcement of KYC/suitability duties
b. Properly Qualified Investor but Unsuitable Investment
In relation to investors who qualify for a prospectus-exempt offering on the basis of sophistication, 
but who are not in fact sophisticated, there are a number of potential ways of addressing type I 
errors in the case of non-brokered offerings. One obvious solution is to raise the threshold pursuant 
to which retail investors qualify as accredited investors. The problem with this is that lowering 
the likelihood of a type I error increases the likelihood of a type II error (i.e., treating some 
sophisticated investors as unsophisticated). Thus, we need to make judgments about the relative 
importance of these two types of errors. From an enforcement point of view, type I errors are likely 
to be costly, as they involve investors placing money in inappropriate investment vehicles. Type 
II errors are not likely to raise pressing enforcement issues (although they may invite breaches of 
securities law by investors seeking to illegally circumvent investment bars that appear to them 
to be unjustified, and also offer an unfair escape route from bad investments for sophisticated 
investors). The chief cost of type II errors is likely to be economic. That is, preventing sophisticated 
investors from investing in various enterprises will tend to dry up the pool of risk capital available 
to Canadian enterprises and therefore be costly from an economic perspective.
Unfortunately, such data as we have concerning the exempt market do not tell us if any particular 
alteration of the balance between type I and type II errors will make things better or worse. To 
answer this question, we need data that tell us what kinds of retail investors use the accredited 
investor exemption, and in relation to what kinds of issuers. We do not have these data.
Under certain conditions, raising the threshold for retail investors could have favourable 
consequences, by reducing the incidence of type I errors while not greatly increasing the incidence 
of type II errors. This might be the case, for example, if the accredited investor exemption is used 
mainly by large firms to raise money from institutions and wealthy retail investors, and if small 
firms rely mainly on the private issuer and FFBA exemptions to raise capital. In this case, raising 
the accredited investor threshold for retail investors will have a favourable impact.
If, on the other hand, small issuers — or some segment of small issuers — place great reliance on 
the accredited investor exemption to raise risk capital, effecting a change could have deleterious 
economic consequences for start-up enterprises and the economy as a whole. As indicated in 
Appendix D, high technology (HT) issuers are much more likely to have constrained capital-raising 
options than their non-high-tech (NHT) counterparts. They are more likely to have to fund their 
growth from the pockets of angel investors who do not qualify under either the private issuer or 
FFBA exemptions. Servicing the needs of such companies is important, as Canada’s economy 
is increasingly dependent on the knowledge-based industries (KBI), and HT start-ups play a 
significant role in innovation and hence the health of the KBI sector. Indeed, the social return 
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to HT investing is on the order of twice the private return.49 Thus, although HT start-ups play a 
comparatively small role in the economy in terms of dollars invested, their economic significance is 
very great.
It may be that this problem is more apparent than real. At present, given the existing definition 
of accredited investor, the risk of a type II error may be quite low. If so, then increasing the 
likelihood of a type II error by decreasing the likelihood of a type I error would not have 
significant economic consequences. 
There are a variety of potential solutions to curbing the likelihood of type I errors. The most 
extreme is to eliminate non-brokered offerings entirely by requiring the involvement of a 
registrant impressed with a duty of suitability. This is a cure that is likely to be worse than the 
disease. Insisting that a registrant be involved will raise costs for investors and make it more 
difficult for issuers to raise money, and the adverse impact will be greatest in respect of offerings 
by small issuers.
Another possible solution is to impress the issuer with a duty of suitability. This too is simply 
unworkable; issuers lack the professional qualifications to make this judgment, and it would be very 
costly to insist that they acquire such expertise.
Another approach would be to require that a registrant be involved in comparatively risky 
offerings involving retail accredited investors. The difficulty with this solution is that virtually any 
set of proxies for risk is itself likely to be subject to a significant likelihood of both type I and type 
II errors.
Yet another solution is to define the accredited investor category more strictly for non-brokered 
offerings. This seems a far more sensible approach than any of the aforementioned solutions 
and has a precedent in the graded distinctions that currently exist among those who qualify as 
permitted clients, accredited investors and eligible investors.
In brokered offerings, the solution to the problem of type I errors is far simpler; it is the vigorous 
enforcement of the KYC and suitability rules impressed upon registrants (and severe penalties for 
misrepresenting the nature of an investment to a client). This greatly reduces the likelihood of type 
I errors while not materially increasing the likelihood of type II errors.
c. Non-Qualified Investor Misrepresented as Qualified Investor 
Whether a distribution is brokered or not, paperwork must be completed in which the investor 
represents himself or herself to be an accredited investor.50 In general, the paperwork may misstate 
the investor’s qualifications because:
a) An unqualified investor dupes an issuer or intermediary into believing that he/she is truly 
an accredited investor (self-misidentification);
b) An issuer or intermediary induces an investor to misrepresent himself or herself as an 
accredited investor (induced misidentification).
Self-Misidentification
The self-misidentification problem arises when an investor chooses to misrepresent to an issuer 
or a market intermediary that he or she is an accredited investor, when this is not the case. Self-
misidentification will tend to result in a mismatch between the investor’s financial goals, risk 
tolerance, ability to withstand loss, etc., and the investment in question. 
49 
Z. J. Acs and D. B. Audretsch, Innovation and Small Firms, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990). 
50 
NI 45-106CP, s.1.9.
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IIROC and the securities regulators have addressed the self-misidentification problem, at least in 
part, by placing an onus on any issuer or intermediary involved in a distribution to exercise some 
level of due diligence to verify investors’ representations that they are capable of taking advantage 
of a prospectus exemption.51 Where registrants are concerned, this forms an integral part of the 
“know your client” and “suitability” obligations. 
The administrative and judicial cases dealing with the misuse of prospectus exemptions suggest 
that cases involving registrant-induced misidentification are more common than cases involving 
self-misidentification. However, this may be the result of selection bias, insofar as cases involving 
self-misidentification will not typically result in any identifiable defendant.52
Registrant-Induced Misidentification
The registrant-induced misidentification problem is a variation of the self-misidentification problem. 
In this case, however, it is the issuer or the market intermediary who induces the investor to misstate 
his or her qualifications on attesting documents collected by the issuer or intermediary. This will 
typically be done to induce the investor to put money into an unsuitable investment that results in 
handsome commissions for the intermediary or a successful capital raise by the issuer. In the case of 
a brokered distribution, such conduct violates the registrant’s suitability obligation to the client. 
G. The Active Participants Rationale
1. Introduction
In some cases, prospectus exemptions are based on the fact that certain classes of purchasers, such 
as directors, officers, founders and control persons, are active participants in the enterprise. A 
prospectus is thus not needed for one or more of the following reasons:
a. Absence of Information Asymmetry
Direct participants already have an intimate knowledge of the enterprise (indeed, they are likely to 
have all the information that a prospectus would provide).
b. Participation in Control of the Issuer
Direct participants may possess or participate in the control of the issuer — a lever that can be used 
to protect their investments.
c. Absence of Incentives to Act Opportunistically
While direct participants might easily be tempted to take advantage of outsiders by selling them 
securities at an inflated value, they do not have an incentive to take advantage of themselves.
The private issuer exemption53 (discussed in Appendix A), insofar as it allows those with 
close connections to the issuer to invest without a prospectus, is an illustration of the active 
participants rationale.
51 Ibid., s.1.9.
52 
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.
53 
NI 45-106, s.2.4.
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2. The Danger of Proxy Slippage
In this case, the hypothesis is that active participants are not investors for whom mandatory 
disclosure is a necessary investor protection measure. A type I error consists of rejecting the idea 
that active participants require mandatory disclosure when in fact they do. A type II error consists of 
accepting the idea that active participants require mandatory disclosure, when in fact they do not.
The danger of type I errors is minimal, for the three reasons just expressed. The danger of type 
II errors only arises if the group of active participants who may invest without a prospectus is 
narrowly drawn. However, the private issuer and FFBA exemptions are drawn widely enough that 
this does not seem to be a problem.
H. The Close Connections Rationale
1. Introduction
Some purchasers have close connections to direct participants in the enterprise. This class of 
persons includes relatives, friends and business associates of the insiders. Such purchasers are less 
at risk than arm’s-length third parties for at least three reasons:
a) Those who are promoting the venture or otherwise closely associated with it, such as 
founders, directors, officers and control persons, are less likely to take advantage of people 
with whom they have a close and continuing personal or business relationship;
b) Those in a close relationship with insiders are in a better position than arm’s-length third 
parties to judge the character and honesty of the insiders;
c) Those in a close relationship with the insiders are likely to have better access to 
information than arm’s-length third parties.
2. The Danger of Proxy Slippage 
The private issuer exemption54 and the FFBA exemption55 (both discussed in Appendix A) rely 
heavily on the close connections rationale. Both qualify persons who are close personal friends and 
close business associates of various active participants. They also qualify various close relatives 
of active participants (e.g., “a spouse, parent, grandparent, brother, sister, child or grandchild of a 
director, executive officer, founder or control person of the issuer”).56 For obvious reasons, these 
inclusions create a considerable risk of a type I error. By contrast, there is probably a minimal risk 
of a type II error.
3. Interpretational Licence
The danger to investors that is posed by type I errors is enhanced by the fact that the close personal 
friend and close business associates categories are subject to interpretational licence. In respect of 
the former, the securities regulators have stated:57
For the purposes of both the private issuer exemptions and the family, friends and business 
associates exemptions, a “close personal friend” of a director, executive officer, founder or 
54 Ibid.
55 
Ibid., ss.2.5, 2.6, 2.6.1.
56 
Ibid., ss.2.4(2) (the private issuer exemption).
57 
NI 45-106CP, s.2.7.
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control person of an issuer is an individual who knows the director, executive officer, founder 
or control person well enough and has known them for a sufficient period of time to be in a 
position to assess their capabilities and trustworthiness.
Similarly, in relation to the close business associate category:
For the purposes of both the private issuer exemptions and the family, friends and business 
associates exemptions, a “close business associate” is an individual who has had sufficient prior 
business dealings with a director, executive officer, founder or control person of the issuer to be 
in a position to assess their capabilities and trustworthiness.
These tests are highly subjective and lend themselves to abuse by opportunistic issuers or 
intermediaries.
4. Lack of Repeat Players
It is very likely that the vast majority of those who are close personal friends, close business 
associates and qualifying relatives are not likely to be repeat players in the type of transaction in 
question, again emphasizing the investor protection issues at play.
I. The Other Protective Mechanisms Rationale
In some cases, a prospectus is not needed because investors are protected by an alternative scheme 
of regulation. For example, securities may be issued pursuant to an amalgamation between two 
entities. Where this is the case, corporate law requires that the amalgamating entities prepare 
information circulars for their shareholders that essentially replicate the information that is required 
to be included in a prospectus, obviating the need for a prospectus. A number of such exemptions 
are indicated in Table 7.
In one case — the TSX Venture Exchange Offering Document exemption — the purported 
exemption is arguably not an exemption at all, in the sense that the information required in the TSX 
Offering Document is similar to (although somewhat less extensive than) the information required 
in a short form prospectus.
As these various protective mechanisms either replicate the protection that is afforded by a 
prospectus, or supply substitute protective mechanisms, there is little danger of type I or type II 
errors, and little reason to believe that there are serious investor protection issues.
J. The Capital Gaps Rationale for Private Issuers
A number of prospectus exemptions are motivated by more than simply a desire to protect 
investors. A principal aim is to address perceived capital gaps in the funding spectrum, subject to 
investor protection constraints.
The capital gaps exemptions (all of which are discussed in Appendix A) are available only for 
private companies58 and include:
a) The FFBA exemption;
b) The private issuer exemption;
c) The CF exemption.
58 
I use the phrase “private company” in the colloquial sense of a non-public company, and not in the strict technical sense 
(i.e., as that term is defined in NI 45-106).
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To the extent that something other than strict investor protection motivates these exemptions, 
investor protection must necessarily be compromised to some degree. 
The CF exemption differs from the FFBA and private issuer exemptions in a number of material 
ways. The FFBA exemption is a wholesale exemption. The private issuer exemption is subject to 
minimal constraints59 and is also essentially a wholesale exemption. By contrast, the CF exemption 
is a complex hybrid exemption.60
There is little doubt that the extensive investor protection mechanisms accompanying the CF 
exemption are recognition of the particular dangers that the exemption poses for investors (i.e., 
there is a high risk of a type I error). With respect to investments by arm’s-length third parties, the 
CF exemption extends the reach of the prospectus exemptions into hitherto uncharted territory. The 
FFBA and private issuer exemptions are premised on the understanding that all investors are either 
direct participants in the issuer or have a close connection to the issuer’s principals. The only arm’s-
length third parties that are allowed into the fold are accredited investors. By contrast, under the CF 
exemption, capital will be raised entirely from arm’s-length third parties, the vast majority of whom 
will be unsophisticated. 
Further investor protection concerns arise from the following:61
a) Most investors will have minimal ability to evaluate the issuer’s business plan, point-of-
sale disclosure or continuing disclosure in any meaningful way;
b) Most investors will have minimal business experience, particularly in relation to start-ups;
c) Capital will be raised from a large number of investors, each holding a small stake. Thus, 
collective action and free rider problems will be severe. This virtually guarantees that CF 
investors will supply little or no effective monitoring or oversight of management;
d) Unlike many angel investors, CF investors will lack the protections afforded by a 
unanimous shareholder agreement;
e) Unlike many angel investors, CF investors will not be value-add investors, and will 
contribute no strategic value to the enterprise.
It has sometimes been argued that there is a collective wisdom to the crowd, such that “a very large 
group produces an emergent intelligence superior to individual investment decisions.”62 I do not 
find this argument persuasive.63 While there may be an additive wisdom concerning the desirability 
or efficacy of a particular product or service, it is standard rote among angel investors and venture 
capitalists that much more is needed for a venture to succeed than a good product. Important 
59 
The issuer must satisfy certain constraints in order to qualify as a private issuer. See NI 45-106, s.2.4.
60 
While abandoning the prospectus requirement, it substitutes a wide range of investor protection mechanisms (summarized 
in Appendix A) that includes, inter alia, restrictions on the type of issuer, the type of securities that may be offered, the 
total proceeds of an offering, the maximum amount that may be purchased by an individual investor (with a sliding scale 
depending on sophistication), mandatory use of a funding portal run by a registrant, point of sale mandatory disclosure, 
continuing mandatory disclosure, generic and dealer-specific point of sale cautions, impermissible uses of proceeds, 
investor right of withdrawal, statutory liabilities for misrepresentation, a mandatory contractual right of rescission and 
damages, a risk acknowledgment form, resale restrictions and a prohibition on advertising. Participating registrants are 
strictly regulated and are required (inter alia) to conduct background checks on the offeror’s principals, review information 
documents, monitor purchaser communications and so on (including, in some cases, a suitability obligation) to purchasers). 
See Appendix A for more detail.
61 
See Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, “Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowdfunding,” National Post, Aug. 1, 
2013, FP 9.
62 
I borrow this apt phrase from the report of an anonymous referee.
63 
MacIntosh, “Extraordinary Popular Delusions …” FP 9.
26
attributes include experienced and professional management, good timing, effective monitoring, 
aggressive marketing and effective strategic execution.64 Crowdfunding supplies none of these things.
Evidence that the crowdfunding exemption is of questionable wisdom may be found in the 
performance of a very different kind of securities offering — the IPO. Evidence from around the 
world is consistent: investors in IPOs realize returns that, on average, substantially trail both the 
pertinent market index and a matched industry cohort of firms.65 Moreover, this return appears to 
be concentrated in smaller IPOs catering mainly to retail investors.66
This evidence is significant because IPOs are associated with the highest level of investor 
protection that securities regulation offers — but the market for IPOs nonetheless does not satisfy 
the fair game criterion. Particularly given the infirmities in the crowdfunding model just outlined, 
it seems plausible to hypothesize that the returns to crowdfunding investors will be even worse.
The crowdfunding model is subject to another serious criticism. As Appendix D makes plain, 
if there is a funding gap that needs to be addressed, it is in relation to high-tech firms, and not 
conventional low-tech firms. The latter’s funding needs would appear to be adequately addressed 
in many or most cases by the entrepreneur’s own resources, those of family, friends and business 
associates, and loan capital provided by banks and similar institutions. High-tech firms are quite 
different in two respects. One is that there is usually a much longer lead time to the realization of 
revenue. The other is that bank loans are rarely available. 
Crowdfunding, however, is a singularly inappropriate model for addressing the capital gap facing 
high-tech firms. As evidence from venture capital exits attests, even highly sophisticated venture 
capitalists have trouble separating winners from losers, and failure rates are extremely high.67 
This suggests that unsophisticated crowdfunding investors will essentially be shooting in the 
dark in picking their crowdfunded investments — hardly a recipe for the enhancement of capital 
market efficiency.
Perhaps the best that can be said about the crowdfunding exemption is that it is likely to prove 
substantially irrelevant to the Canadian fundraising landscape. Experience from jurisdictions that 
permit crowdfunding suggests that the annual contribution of crowdfunding to aggregate capital 
raised will constitute a very small fraction of one per cent.
K. The Capital Raising Rationale for Public Issuers
In late 2015 and early 2016, the OSC adopted four new prospectus exemptions in Ontario: the 
existing security holder exemption; the CF exemption; the family, friends and business associates 
exemption; and the offering memorandum exemption (although the latter two existed in other 
jurisdictions prior to the OSC’s adoption).68 Two of these — the existing security holders’ 
64 
See e.g., Thomas Hellman and Manju Puri, “Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical 
Evidence,” 57 Journal of Finance 169, 2002.
65 
See e.g., Jay R. Ritter, “The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings,” 46 Journal of Finance, 1991, 3; Tim 
Loughran and Jay R. Ritter, “The New Issues Puzzle,” 50 Journal of Finance 23, 1995.
66 
Alon Brav, Christopher Gecy, and Paul Gompers, “Is the Abnormal Return Following Equity Issuances Anomalous?” 56 
Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 209.
67 
Douglas J. Cumming and Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, “Venture Capital Exits in Canada and the United States,” 53 University of 
Toronto Law Journal 101, 2003.
68 
The existing security holder prospectus exemption came into force in Ontario on Feb. 11, 2015; the family, friends and 
business associates exemption on May 5, 2015; the offering memorandum exemption on Jan. 13, 2016; and the crowdfunding 
exemption on Jan. 25, 2016.
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exemption69 and the rights offering exemption,70 apply only to public companies. As with the capital 
gaps exemptions, these exemptions are motivated by more than strictly investor protection. 
The existing security holders’ exemption allows existing security holders in a public company to 
purchase additional securities of the type being offered. There are no disclosure requirements. 
However, the offering is subject to a $15,000 limit per person per year (unless suitability advice is 
obtained from an investment dealer) and a four-month hold period.
The rights offering exemption allows security holders of a public company to purchase additional 
securities in the company by exercising rights distributed by the company. There are minimal 
disclosure requirements, and the securities received are freely tradable. 
There is little reason to believe that existing security holders of a public company are in a better 
position to assess the risk and expected return of an offering than any other investor. Savvy 
investors hold diversified portfolios of securities, and most investors know little more (if indeed 
anything more) about each of the companies in their portfolios than other public market investors. 
Indeed, the primary protection for purchasers under these exemptions is the practical necessity of 
pricing the offering off the secondary market price. But if this is the case, it is not clear why there 
should not be an equivalent prospectus exemption in all post-IPO offerings.
L. Alternative Disclosure Regimes
The offering memorandum (OM) exemption is in fact an alternative disclosure regime with far less 
mandated disclosure than a prospectus. It is available to both public and private companies. The 
additional peril that reduced disclosure creates for investors is addressed by imposing annual limits 
on the amount that may be invested which vary depending on whether the investor is an eligible 
investor or not. Eligible investors are qualified on a basis very similar to accredited investors, but 
with quite sharply reduced net income and net asset requirements.
Clearly, the offering memorandum exemption raises the probability of type I errors. This does not 
necessarily mean that it is misconceived, however. It will no doubt be far cheaper to put together 
an offering memorandum than a prospectus. Nonetheless, the evidence presented in Table 4 and 
associated text suggests that the OM exemption accounts for a modest fraction of all exempt 
financing. Its modest success also demonstrates that it is not viewed as an alternative to a public 
offering by prospectus. Why this is the case is a potentially fruitful area for future research
M. Policy-Driven Exemptions
A small number of exemptions are based on industrial policy, such as the government incentive 
security exemption in Ontario.71 These are based on furthering the interests of particular industries 
or sectors of the economy.
N. Isolated Distributions
A kind of residual clause exists for one-off exemptions that cannot be justified under any other 
exemption; the isolated distribution exemption. It is rarely relied on and serves mainly as a final 
recourse for issuers who cannot justify their distribution under any other exemption.
69 
OSC Rule 45-501, s.2.9.
70 
NI 45-106, ss.2.1-2.1.4.
71 
Ontario Rule 45-501, s.2.1.
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O. Summary
Table 9 summarizes the dangers of type I and type II errors for the various types of exemptions  
just discussed.
TABLE 9 PROXY SLIPPAGE: TYPE I AND TYPE II ERRORS
Type of 
Error
Safe  
Securities
Sophistication
(institutional 
investors)
Sophistication
(retail  
investors)
Active  
Participants
Close
Connections
Other Protective 
Mechanisms  
(i.e., prospectus  
equivalents or near 
equivalents)
Capital 
Gaps 
(Private 
Issuers)
Capital  
Raising  
(Public 
Issuers)
Alternative 
Disclosure 
Regimes
(falling 
short of 
prospectus 
disclosure)
Type I S S L S L S L L M
Type II S S S S S S S S S
LEGEND: S = Small, M = Medium, L = Large
VI.  WHERE ARE ENFORCEMENT ISSUES MOST LIKELY TO OCCUR? SOME  
CONJECTURES FROM FIRST PRINCIPLES
A. Least Likely Cases
1. Exempt Securities Sold to Institutional Buyers
Most institutional investors qualify as accredited investors, and so may invest without the benefit of 
a prospectus. As noted earlier, most institutional investors will indeed be sophisticated, and there 
is little likelihood that either type I or type II errors will result from allowing institutions to invest. 
Thus, it is relatively unlikely that prospectus-exempt sales to such buyers will depart from the fair 
game criterion, whether the securities being sold are debt or equity.
The empirics described earlier suggest institutional buyers are significant users of the exempt market. 
2. Exempt Securities Sold to High Net Worth Individuals
High net worth individuals are very likely to be sophisticated investors and/or have the resources to 
engage the assistance of sophisticated market professionals. Unfortunately, it is not possible from 
the data to determine which offerings are sold to high net worth individuals. 
3. Short-Term Debt Sold by Financial Institutions
Jog suggests that a primary user of the exempt market is financial institutions using the exempt 
market to raise short-term debt under an exemption specifically crafted for that purpose.72 Such 
debt is sold to institutional buyers, thus presenting relatively few dangers of abuse.
4. Exempt Securities Sold by Public Companies
Public companies sell exempt securities at or near the prevailing market price. Public companies 
are subject to extensive mandatory disclosure requirements, including the requirement to file an 
72 See Jog, 10, 12 (note 45), and Table 7 (16-17). NI 45-106, s.2.35 exempts from the prospectus requirement the issuance of “a 
negotiable promissory note or commercial paper maturing not more than one year from the date of issue.”
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AIF, MD&A (with each set of financial statements), material change reports, business acquisition 
reports and proxy circulars. Moreover, all of this is available at no charge to all users on SEDAR, 
which is an online information library containing all publicly filed issuer documents. Thus, such 
distributions are subject to a relatively low risk of being mispriced. 
There is a distinction in this respect, however, between large public companies that trade in 
deep markets and small companies that trade in thin markets. Larger public companies usually 
have many shareholders, many of whom are institutional. For this reason, these companies are 
likely to receive a great deal of scrutiny not only from institutional investment professionals, but 
from the press, analysts and regulators. By contrast, small public companies have relatively few 
shareholders, many or all of whom will typically be retail shareholders. These companies are not 
closely followed by any of the aforementioned constituencies. In addition, because of the small 
public float and thin trading, price discovery will tend to be far less effective than for large public 
companies. Obviously, there is more danger that the public market price will fail at any given time 
to represent the best estimate of the true or intrinsic value of the issuer. For this reason, exempt 
distributions by small public issuers pose somewhat greater risks to investors.
B. Most Likely to Occur
1. Introduction
The prospectus exemptions seek to match investments to investors according to the latter’s 
tolerance for risk (both psychic and financial), and investment experience and sophistication. 
Problems in achieving this matching are most likely to occur in relation to unreported exempt 
financings and retail investors for a number of reasons that are outlined below.
2. Unreported Exemptions
Non-reporting raises clear enforcement issues. However, it is not clear that there is any obvious 
solution. If regulators are unaware that an illegal financing has occurred, they obviously cannot act. 
They are likely to find out about illegal distributions only when an investment turns out poorly and 
disappointed investors seek regulatory redress. Given the large number of unreported and illegal 
exempt financings, it appears that this occurs in a small minority of cases.
3. Retail Investors: Proxy Slippage
While proxy slippage is not a significant problem for institutional investors, it is a very real problem 
for retail investors.
The problem of proxy slippage clearly arises in relation to the most important of the prospectus 
exemptions (at least by dollars raised) — the accredited investor exemption. While a possible 
solution would be to make it more difficult to qualify as an accredited investor, this would be a 
perilous practice. It could easily have deleterious consequences for small company efforts to raise 
capital, particularly for small high-technology issuers that have little access to credit markets and 
for whom angel investors are a vital source of funding.
The degree of proxy slippage should (at least in theory) be substantially less in the case of brokered 
offerings. In a brokered offering, a market intermediary such as a registered representative or 
exempt market dealer participates in the transaction. In such cases, the market intermediary has a 
duty to assess the suitability of the investment for each client, based on individualized factors such 
as investment knowledge, investment sophistication, financial goals, ability to withstand financial 
loss and risk tolerance.
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involving brokered offerings. However, brokered distributions are not exempt from problems; in the 
interest of earning trading commissions, the registrant has an incentive to shoehorn retail clients 
into unsuitable exempt offerings (with or without the client’s complicity).
There is potent evidence that retail investors are poor shoppers when it comes to the purchase 
advisor.73 A comprehensive investigation of the European Market,74 for example, found that:
malfunctioning. In particular, the 2010 Scoreboard shows that the market for “investments, 
performance; worst for ease of comparing products and services sold by different suppliers; 
worst in trust that suppliers will respect consumer protection rules; fourth worst in 
evolved so much that consumers are often ill-prepared to make sound decisions about 
related to instincts driving consumers towards choices that are inconsistent with their long- 
term preferences. Recent evidence shows that consumers often have limited time to fully 
Thus, although economists often rely on the discipline induced by repeat players and vendor 
reputation to produce an element of consumer protection, these controls do not seem to work in the 
retail market for registrant services.
Table 10 indicates that “trading without registration and/or prospectus and/or exemption” is 
responsible for 17 per cent of all investor contacts with the Ontario regulators, which is more than 
securities regulators (although the OSC offers no data on how many of these complaints were 
sustained, or the number and dollar value of the securities involved).75
73 
unsophisticated investors who trade on noise rather than real information. See e.g., Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean, and 
Ning Zhu, “Do Noise Traders Move Markets?” EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings Paper, September 2006, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=869827 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.869827.
74 “Consumer Decision-Making in Retail Investment Services: A Behavioural Economics Perspective: Final Report,” 
75 
retail purchases of relatively modest numbers of securities representing a modest dollar value, in which case the OSC’s 
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TABLE 10 ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION ASSISTANCE FOR INVESTORS, 2014-2015
Most common areas of contact with investors
Trading without registration and/or prospectus and/or exemption 17 %
Information about public companies and investment offerings 11 %
Registrant services-related issues 11 %
Information about hearings, proceedings and orders 10 %
Checking advisor registration, prospectus or exemption 8 %
Abusive trading or market manipulation 7 %
Registrant misconduct, registrant-related (OSC) rules 7 %
Inadequate or misleading disclosure 7 %
Educational materials, resources for retail investors 3 %
Shareholder rights, director/officer responsibilities, corporate law 3 %
Scams / frauds / misrepresentations 2 %
Illegal insider trading 1 %
How and where to complain 1 %
All other 12 %
Source: Ontario Securities Commission Annual Report, 2015, 88 (based on 4,662 total contacts from investors to the 
OSC Inquiries & Contact Centre).
4. Retail Investors: Self-Misidentification
The self-misidentification problem arises when an investor chooses to misrepresent to an issuer or a 
market intermediary that he or she is an accredited investor, when this is not in fact the case.
Self-misidentification is a problem because it will tend to result in a mismatch between the investor’s 
financial goals, risk tolerance, ability to withstand loss, etc., and the investment in question. 
IIROC and the securities regulators have addressed the self-misidentification problem, at least in 
part, by placing an onus on any intermediary involved in the distribution, as well as the issuer, 
to make efforts to verify investors’ representations that they are capable of taking advantage of a 
prospectus exemption.76 Where registrants are concerned, this forms an integral part of the “know 
your client” and “suitability” obligations. 
The administrative and judicial cases dealing with the misuse of prospectus exemptions suggest that 
cases of self-misidentification are rare. Much more common is registrant-induced misidentification. 
5. Retail Investors: Registrant-Induced Misidentification
The registrant-induced misidentification problem is a variation of the self-misidentification 
problem. In this case, however, it is the issuer or the market intermediary who induces the investor 
to misstate his or her qualifications on attesting documents collected by the issuer or intermediary. 
This will typically be done in order to induce the investor to put money into an unsuitable 
investment that results in handsome commissions for the intermediary a successful capital raise by 
the issuer.
In the case of a brokered distribution, such conduct violates the registrant’s suitability obligation to 
the client. 
76 
NI 45-106CP, s.1.9.
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6.  Retail Investors: Issuer or Intermediary Misrepresentation of  
Investment Characteristics
In some cases, retail investors who technically qualify to make a prospectus-exempt investment 
will do so only on the basis of a misrepresentation by the issuer or intermediary as to the risk/
return characteristics of the investment. The matching problem in this case is not a product 
misrepresentations about the nature of the investment itself. Retail investors — even of 
the sophisticated variety — are more likely than institutional investors to fall prey to such 
misrepresentations, as they will typically lack the resources available to their institutional 
counterparts to verify representations regarding risk/return.
VII. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS RELATED TO PROSPECTUS EXEMPTIONS
A. Introduction
In this section, I examine the deployment of enforcement resources with respect to the prospectus 
exemptions, by industry self-regulatory organizations, securities regulators and courts. The focus of 
this examination is on the decided corpus of cases relating to abuse of the prospectus exemptions.
categories of dealer registrant:77
a) investment dealer
b) mutual fund dealer
c) scholarship plan dealer
d) exempt market dealer
e) restricted dealer
The bulk of prospectus-exempt transactions involve investment dealers, mutual fund dealers and 
exempt market dealers. Relatively few (either in number or dollar value) involve scholarship plan 
dealers or restricted dealers.78
Securities law requires investment dealers (but not exempt market dealers) to be members of 
IIROC.79 In like fashion, mutual fund dealers must be members of the Mutual Fund Dealers 
Association of Canada (MFDA)80
persons, group insurance of persons and scholarship plan brokerage). There is no SRO for exempt 
market dealers.
77 NI 31-103, Part 7.
78 The category of restricted dealer is a sort of residual discretionary category. A market actor that fails to qualify under any of 
the other four categories of registration may apply to the regulators for discretionary permission to act as a restricted dealer. 
NI 31-103 states:
    The restricted dealer category in subsection 7.1(2)(e) permits specialized dealers that may not qualify under another 
dealer category to carry on a limited trading business. It is intended to be used only if there is a compelling case for the 
proposed trading to take place outside the other registration categories.
79 NI 31-103, s.9.1.
80 Ibid., s.9.2.
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Where enforcement matters arise, dealers who are members of an SRO are subject to discipline by 
that SRO. Thus, IIROC hears matters relating to investment dealers, while MFDA and CSF hear 
matters relating to mutual fund dealers.81 Since exempt market dealers (EMD) are not required to be 
members of any SRO, enforcement issues relating to EMD are dealt with by the securities regulators.
B. Compliance Reviews
As noted in Appendix B, one of the sources of regulatory oversight, for both SROs and the 
securities regulators, is ad hoc compliance reviews of dealers. The OSC conducts reviews 
of advisers, exempt market dealers, scholarship plan dealers and investment fund managers; 
IIROC conducts compliance reviews of the dealing operations of investment dealers and futures 
commission merchants; and MFDA conducts reviews of the dealing operations of mutual fund 
dealers.82 The results of the securities regulators’ compliance reviews are published annually in 
order to give guidance to dealers with respect to regulatory developments and initiatives, common 
compliance deficiencies, best practices, and more generally what is expected of each type of dealer 
overseen by the regulators.
The 2015 summary,83 for example, indicates that in its compliance reviews the OSC found frequent 
failures on the part of EMDs to properly perform their foundational KYC and suitability duties, 
together with guidelines as to how these duties should appropriately be discharged.84 
These compliance reviews play an important but largely invisible part of the enforcement process.
81 
NI 31-103 formally transfers responsibility for oversight of the dealer’s know-your-client and suitability obligations to 
IIROC and MFDA. See NI 31-103, s.3.16. It also transfers other core regulatory responsibilities as well as its enforcement 
jurisdiction: see NI 31-103, ss.6.2, 6.3, 9.3, 9.4, 10.2, 10.3, Appendix G.
82 
See “OSC Compliance Reviews” available at https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Dealers_compliance-review_index.htm . The 
OSC website indicates that it selects firms for review on the following basis:
    The OSC typically uses a risk assessment model to select firms for compliance reviews. We send out a risk assessment 
questionnaire periodically to gather information about a firm’s business operations. The information we receive is used to 
apply a risk ranking to a firm. This allows us to allocate resources more effectively and efficiently by targeting firms with 
higher risk rankings.
 
See Ontario Securities Commission, “OSC Compliance Reviews” available at https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Dealers_
compliance-review_index.htm . In addition, OSC has stated that if a firm is selected for review, it can expect that the OSC 
staff will:
   •  Interview the firm’s senior management and other key employees;
   •  Examine the firm’s books and records and financial transactions; and
   •  Assess the firm’s internal controls, compliance system, disclosure, marketing practices, and policies and procedures.
 
Ontario Securities Commission, “If Your Firm is Selected for Review,” available at https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Dealers_
firm-selected-review_index.htm . If the firm is not in compliance, the staff may take a number of actions, including:
   •  Tracking and monitoring the firm or individual;
   •  Conducting a follow-up review;
   •  Imposing terms and conditions on registration, or referring the matter to the OSC Enforcement Branch.
 
See Ontario Securities Commission, “If Your Firm is not in Compliance,” available at https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/
Dealers_firm-not-compliance_index.htm . In addition, the OSC has published an “Exempt Market Dealer Compliance 
Field Review List of Books and Records Requested for Review” to let EMDs know what to expect in a compliance review. 
Ontario Securities Commission, “Exempt Market Dealer Compliance Field Review List of Books and Records Requested 
for Review,” available at https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Dealers/da_20100409_emd-books-records.pdf .
83 
Ontario Securities Commission, “Annual Summary Report for Dealers, Advisers and Investment Fund Managers 
Compliance and Registrant Regulation,” OSC Staff Notice 33-746, Sept. 21, 2015.
84 Ibid., 51. The 2015 report also discusses recent amendments to the rules that limit the scope of EMD activities. It also 
indicates that, as a result of the four new exemptions adopted in Ontario in 2015 and 2016, dealers relying on the exemptions 
are expected to “establish, maintain and apply internal controls and procedures to monitor compliance with the new 
prospectus exemptions and to manage the risks associated with its business in accordance with prudent business practices.” 
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C. IIROC Enforcement Actions
1. Registrants and Exempt Market Financings
Understanding IIROC enforcement proceedings related to the abuse of prospectus exemptions 
necessarily entails some understanding of registrants’ role in prospectus-exempt financings, the 
manner in which IIROC regulates registrants and the sanctions that IIROC has at its disposal for 
disciplining registrants who misbehave.
Where an issuer seeks to sell securities, the default rule is that either the issuer itself or any market 
intermediary that assists in the distribution must be registered (i.e., licensed).85 The registration 
system is designed to ensure that securities market professionals have sufficient integrity, 
education, training and financial soundness to properly carry out their intermediary function and 
serve their clients.
Generally speaking, when securities market lawyers and regulators refer to the “exempt market”, 
they are referring to the market in which securities may be sold free of both the prospectus 
requirement and the registration requirement. Indeed, in most cases in which a prospectus 
exemption is available, a corresponding registration exemption is also available.86 
In many cases in which money is raised via a prospectus-exempt financing, it will be difficult or 
impossible to find a registrant who is willing to act as an intermediary. This includes small firms, 
firms raising small amounts of capital, and firms doing business in areas currently disfavoured 
by market participants and therefore by registrants. Thus, the principal mechanism for effecting 
investor protection lies in the design of the exemption itself.
Nonetheless, it is not uncommon for investors (particularly retail investors) to place their 
investments — including those that are prospectus-exempt — through a registrant such as an 
investment dealer87 or an exempt market dealer.88 This adds a layer of investor protection to these 
purchases, since these market intermediaries are impressed with a legal duty to gather information 
from their clients regarding their financial situation, tolerance for risk, investment experience, 
investment sophistication, investment time horizon and other matters (the so-called “know your 
client” duty,89 referred to below as the KYC duty), and to assess the suitability of trading in the 
client’s account based on those factors.90 The obligation to assess suitability applies to the type of 
account opened by the client, every trade in the account, the trading strategy (whether originating 
with the investment advisor or the client), the composition, adequacy of diversification and liquidity 
of the client’s portfolio, and other risk factors.91 
The suitability duty applies even to orders the client initiates. Under securities regulatory rules, if 
the registrant believes that the client’s trading instructions would effect a trade that is unsuitable for 
that client, the registrant must inform the client and refuse to complete the trade unless the client 
85 
It is very rare for the issuer to be registered (and to use no intermediary). In virtually all cases where a firm offers securities 
via a prospectus, a professional underwriter will be hired to sell the issue. Where an intermediary is used in an exempt 
offering, that intermediary must be registered in at least the “exempt market dealer” category.
86 
Most of the exemptions are set out in NI 45-106, although many of the provinces have additional exemptions set out in their 
own rules.
87 
NI 31-103, s.7.1(1).
88 Ibid.
89 
Ibid., s.13.2.
90 
Ibid., ss.13.2(1) states:
    A registrant must take reasonable steps to ensure that, before it makes a recommendation to or accepts an instruction 
from a client to buy or sell a security, or makes a purchase or sale of a security for a client’s managed account, the 
purchase or sale is suitable for the client. 
91 
See generally Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Brokers Duties to Investors (forthcoming, LexisNexis Canada).
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instructs the registrant to proceed nonetheless.92 IIROC rules go even further, requiring the client 
to certify in writing that he/she/it has been instructed that the registrant believes the trade to be 
unsuitable but that the client wishes to proceed in any case. IIROC decisions suggest that in some 
circumstances, the registrant should unconditionally refuse to execute an unsuitable trade.
In addition, the duty to assess suitability arises whether the intermediary’s client is sophisticated 
or unsophisticated, subject only to narrowly drawn exceptions. Generally speaking, only clients 
who are at the top end of the sophistication totem pole are not subject to the suitability duty. That 
includes Canadian financial institutions93 and so-called permitted clients. The latter is defined in 
a manner very similar to the accredited investor category of prospectus exemption, but includes 
mostly institutional investors and excludes all but the wealthiest individual investors.94
In this respect, the suitability obligation evinces an element of paternalism, insofar as it seeks to 
protect clients — even a wide range of sophisticated clients — from their own bad investment 
choices, at least where the registrant believes that a proposed trade is unsuitable for the client (i.e., 
inconsistent with the client’s financial means, ability to withstand financial loss, risk tolerance, 
investment horizon, investment experience and sophistication, and other factors).95
In short, orders for exempt market securities placed by investors through a market intermediary are 
subject to an additional layer of investor protection even where the exempt trade is formally subject 
to a registration exemption. The following section details IIROC sanctions in cases involving 
prospectus exemptions.
2. IIROC Enforcement Cases
A search was conducted in IIROC’s online database for cases involving professional misconduct 
relating to the prospectus exemptions. In the 13-year period from March 2003 to the end of 2016,  
18 cases yielding a decision were found — all of them involving registrant misconduct in relation 
to retail clients.96 In these 18 cases, 15 individuals97 and four corporations were sanctioned. Tables 
11-15 indicate the nature of these cases and their disposition.
Three types of respondents were sanctioned in the various cases: i) individual investment advisors 
(15); ii) individual supervisory personnel and branch managers (four98); iii) registrant firms (four).
Table 11 indicates that there were two legal bases enlisted by IIROC as grounds for finding that 
individual registrants had acted inappropriately: failure to properly carry out the individual 
registrant’s KYC/suitability obligations, and the broad-textured rule against conduct unbecoming 
by registrants. In the case of compliance personnel, the legal basis was the conduct unbecoming 
rule. In the case of registrant firms, it was the conduct unbecoming rule, failure to ensure that 
individual investment advisors carried out their KYC/suitability obligations and a specific IIROC 
rule requiring proper supervision of investment personnel.
92 
NI 31-103, s.13.3(1), (2).
93 Ibid., s.13.3(3).
94 
Ibid., s.1.1. See also NI 31-103, s.8.22.1 (dealer registration requirement does not apply to a trade in non-convertible short-
term debt if the purchaser is a permitted client).
95 
I do not mean to suggest that this is necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, investment firms are arguably well situated, at low cost, 
to perform a highly useful gatekeeper function that many or most clients (even sophisticated ones) would be comfortable 
accepting ex ante as an implicit part of their contract with the investment advisor.
96 
It is noteworthy that the Canadian Securities Administrators Enforcement Report for 2015 indicates that IIROC, MFDA and 
CSF concluded 112 enforcement cases in 2014 and 139 in 2015. Canadian Securities Administrators Enforcement Report 
2015, 19. Thus, the IIROC database appears to digest only a fraction of the enforcement cases disposed of each year.
97 
Four of the individuals were sanctioned both as investment advisors and as compliance officers or branch managers.
98 As I have noted, these four were also sanctioned as investment advisors.
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Table 12 indicates the nature of the illegal distributions carried out. In about two-thirds of the 
cases involving individual registrants, the registrant was directly responsible for the breach of 
the exemption rules, either by deliberately attempting to disguise what the registrant knew was 
an illegal distribution, or otherwise inducing the client to invest where the registrant knew that 
no exemption was available. The remaining cases involve the registrant turning a blind eye to the 
client’s self-identification as an exempt investor. Thus, there are no cases in the sample involving 
pure client self-identification without registrant complicity.
TABLE 11 LEGAL BASES FOR ADVERSE FINDINGS IN IIROC PROCEEDINGS
A. INDIVIDUAL INVESTMENT ADVISORS99100
ILLEGAL ACTS NUMBER OF CASES PERCENTAGE
Conduct Unbecoming103 15 of 15 100%
KYC/Suitability Failure104 5 of 15 33%
B. INDIVIDUAL COMPLIANCE PERSONNEL OR BRANCH OFFICERS101
ILLEGAL ACTS NUMBER OF CASES PERCENTAGE
Conduct Unbecoming105 4 of 4 100%
C. REGISTRANT FIRMS102103104
ILLEGAL ACTS NUMBER OF CASES PERCENTAGE
Conduct Unbecoming106 2 of 4 50%
Failure to Establish and Maintain a  
Proper Supervisory System107 2 of 4 50%
Failure to Ensure Investment Advisor  
Compliance With KYC/Suitability Duties108 2 of 4 50%
TABLE 12 NATURE OF ILLEGAL DISTRIBUTION
A. INDIVIDUAL INVESTMENT ADVISORS105
Circumvention Of $150,000 Investment Requirement109 by the Formation of an Investment Club, Partnership  
or Other Entity in Order to Disguise the Number of Beneficial Purchasers 4 of 15 (27%)
Inducing Clients to Purchase Securities Where No Prospectus Filed and No Prospectus Exemption Available 6 of 15 (40%)
Failure to Reasonably Inquire of a Client Whether He/She Qualifies for a Prospectus Exemption 5 of 15 (33%)
99 
IIROC Bylaw 29.1, the conduct unbecoming rule, states:
 
   Dealer Members and each partner, Director, Officer, Supervisor, Registered Representative, Investment Representative 
and employee of a Dealer Member (i) shall observe high standards of ethics and conduct in the transaction of their 
business, (ii) shall not engage in any business conduct or practice which is unbecoming or detrimental to the public 
interest, and (iii) shall be of such character and business repute and have such experience and training as is consistent 
with the standards described in clauses (i) and (ii) or as may be prescribed by the Board.
100 
IIROC Rules 1300.1(a), (p), (q), (r).
101 
IIROC Bylaw 29.1.
102 Ibid.
103 
IDA Regulation 29.27, IIROC Rule 38.1.
104 
IIROC Rules 1300.1(a), (p), (q), (r).
105 
The $150,000 exemption no is no longer available to individuals in Ontario.
37
B. INDIVIDUAL COMPLIANCE PERSONNEL
Failure To Properly Supervise Investment Advisor(s) To Ensure that No Securities Were Sold to Clients 
Without a Prospectus or a Prospectus Exemption
4 of 15 (all cases) (27%)
4 of 4 (cases involving compliance personnel) (100%)
C. REGISTRANT FIRM
Failure to Establish and Maintain a System of Controls and Supervision to Ensure that Clients Were 
Properly Qualified to Purchase Securities Without a Prospectus
3 of 15 (all cases) (20%)
3 of 4 (cases involving firm-level failure) (75%)
Failure to Investigate Whether Persons Representing Themselves as Accredited Investors Were in  
Fact Accredited Investors
1 of 15 (all cases) (0.67%)
1 of 4 (cases involving firm-level failure) (25%)
Table 13 presents summary statistics on the 15 cases in which individuals were sanctioned.
TABLE 13 IIROC SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS: SUMMARY STATISTICS106107108
Type Of Sanction: Individuals Number Of Cases (and %) Average
Fine 15 of 15 (100%) $42,070110
Costs 15 of 15 (100%) $16,938111
Reimbursement 1 of 15 (0.67%) Amount unknown
Disgorgement 3 of 15 (20%) $3,450 (all cases)
$18,070 (cases in which disgorgement was awarded)
Close Supervision 7 of 15 (47%) 7.5 months
Retake CPH Course 12 of 15 (80%) N/A
Suspension 6 of 15 (40%) N/A112
Lifetime Ban 1 of 15 (7%) N/A
The four cases involving IIROC disciplinary proceedings against firms are digested in Tables 14 
and 15. Table 11 indicates that the three legal grounds for sanctioning firms were: i) the conduct 
unbecoming rule; ii) the failure to establish and maintain a proper supervisory system;109 and iii) 
the failure to ensure investment advisor compliance with the KYC/suitability duties. Although the 
second and third grounds arise under distinct IIROC rules, there is an obvious overlap. The second 
ground speaks to a generalized supervisory failure, while the third speaks more to a supervisory 
failure unique to the case at hand.
Table 15 presents summary statistics on the sanctions against industry firms.
106 
This figure reduces to $29,430 when one outlier is removed.
107 
This figure reduces to $11,635 when one outlier is removed.
108 
Both because there is one outlier of 15 years, and because the types of suspensions are not homogeneous, it does not seem 
appropriate to calculate an average.
109 
In two of the four cases, the firm was found to have engaged in pervasive supervisory failure resulting in the sale of 
securities to a large number of clients where no prospectus had been filed and no prospectus exemption was available. One 
of these involved no fewer than 72 investment advisors: Re Scotia Capital, 2015 IIROC 27.
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TABLE 14 IIROC SANCTIONS AGAINST INDUSTRY FIRMS110111
Case Fine Costs Compensation  of Clients
Disgorgement  
of Profits or  
Commissions
Rewrite Firm’s  
Compliance  
Procedures
Internal Discipline of 
Persons Involved
1 $500,000 $0114 Y $1,768 (profits) Y Y
2 $25,000 Indeterminate115 N N N N
3 $2,000,000 $50,000 N N N N
4 $150,000 $4,000 N N N N
TABLE 15 IIROC SANCTIONS AGAINST INDUSTRY FIRMS: SUMMARY STATISTICS112
Type of Sanction: Individuals Number of Cases (and %) Average
Fine 4 of 4 (100%) $668,750
Costs 3 of 4 (75%) $18,000116
Reimbursement 0 of 4 (0%) $0
Disgorgement 1 of 4 (25%) $440
Rewrite Firm’s Compliance Procedures 1 of 4 (25%) N/A
Internal Discipline of Persons Involved 1 of 4 (25%)
D.  Securities Regulatory Actions Related to the Enforcement of Prospectus 
Exemptions versus Other Subject Matters
As noted, the provincial and territorial securities regulators cede jurisdiction in cases involving 
registrants to IIROC, MFDA and (in Quebec) the CSF. Thus, reported cases emanating from the 
securities regulators involve non-registrants. These non-registrants have spearheaded or been 
involved in the illegal sale of securities without a prospectus or a prospectus exemption, in some 
cases falsely passing themselves off as registered dealers or advisors.
The nature of the securities regulatory enforcement process, as compiled by the Canadian 
Securities Administrators, is indicated in Appendix B, which indicates that the impetus for 
enforcement cases comes from two sources — internal and external. Internally, information related 
to abuse of the prospectus exemptions often comes from ad hoc or periodic reviews of registrant 
firms or individuals to determine whether the rules are being followed. However, if a problem 
regarding a registrant is detected, the case will be referred to the appropriate SRO for disciplinary 
action. Thus, in cases involving non-registrants, the main source of information is usually external 
(i.e., complaints from investors).
In their annual enforcement reports, the Canadian Securities Administrators compile statistics 
relating to enforcement actions. These reports indicate that more enforcement proceedings are 
undertaken in relation to illegal distributions than any other matter (see Table 16). The 2015 report, 
for example, indicates that of all enforcement actions commenced from 2013 to 2015, 48 per cent 
related to illegal distributions.113 A similar percentage (52 per cent) related to enforcement matters 
concluded in the same period.114 Thus, of all the issues that securities regulators deal with, illegal 
distributions consume the greatest enforcement resources.
110 
The firm in question (Scotia Capital) was given credit for co-operation, as it voluntarily came forward when it discovered 
the failures to comply with the rules.
111 Set over for separate hearing, which does not appear to be available.
112 
Of the three cases in which costs are known.
113 
53 per cent in 2013, 45 per cent in 2014 and 46 per cent in 2015.
114 
CSA Enforcement Report 2015, 14.
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As Table 17 indicates, 26 per cent of all fines and administrative penalties levied by Canadian 
securities regulators in 2015 were levied in relation to illegal distributions.115 The percentage was 
similar in 2014 (30 per cent) but substantially higher in 2013 (48 per cent).
TABLE 16 SECURITIES REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS COMMENCED IN 2013-2015
TYPE OF OFFENCE 2013 2014 2015
Illegal Distributions 144 (53% of total) 127 (45% of total) 123 (46% of total)
Fraud 56 81 64
Misconduct by Registrants 19 23 15
Illegal Insider Trading 13 7 14
Disclosure Violations 14 4 5
Market Manipulation 6 23 18
Other Cases 18 16 27
TOTAL 270 281 266
Source: CSA 2015 Enforcement Report, available at  
http://er-ral.csa-acvm.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CSA_AnnualReport_English_20151.pdf, 13.
TABLE 17 SECURITIES REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT FINES AND ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES, 2013-2015
TYPE OF OFFENCE 2013 2014 2015
Illegal Distributions $16,976,063 $17,600,090 $36,571,080
Fraud $12,997,120 $23,038,461 $68,460,000
Misconduct by Registrants $1,305,004 $7,476,755 $2,485,394
Illegal Insider Trading $3,428,000 $87,850 $5,240,872
Disclosure Violations $60,000 $79,500 $30,000
Market Manipulation $75,000 $61,500 $24,187,450
Other Cases $520,000 $7,895,000 $1,324,000
TOTAL $35,361,187 $58,239,156 $138,298,796
Source: CSA 2015 Enforcement Report, available at  
http://er-ral.csa-acvm.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CSA_AnnualReport_English_20151.pdf, 13.
Particularly striking about these figures is the large number of securities regulatory proceedings 
when compared to IIROC proceedings over a much longer period of time. The online IIROC 
database contains only 18 enforcement actions related to prospectus exemptions, covering the 
period 2003-2016. By contrast, in the three-year period from 2013 to 2015, the regulators brought 
538 actions. However, the CSA Enforcement Report for 2015 states that IIROC, MFDA and 
CSF concluded 112 enforcement cases in 2014 and 139 in 2015.116 While it is not clear how many 
actions were brought by each SRO, this figure suggests a loose equivalency between the number of 
IIROC disciplinary cases and the number of securities regulatory disciplinary cases (which in turn 
suggests the IIROC online database does not digest all enforcement proceedings).
115 
2015 was characterized by a number of unusually large fines. Re Zhu, 2015 BCSECCOM 264 (B.C. Sec. Comm.) resulted in 
fines of $28 million for an illegal distribution (in addition to disgorgement orders in the amount of $42 million). Re Rashida 
Samji, Rashida Samji Notary Corporation and Samji & Assoc. Holdings Inc., 2015 BCSECCOM 29 (B.C. Sec. Comm.) 
resulted in fines of $33 million (in addition to disgorgement orders in the amount of $10.8 million). Re Lathigee et al., 2015 
BCSECCOM 78 (B.C. Sec. Comm.) resulted in fines of $30 million (in addition to disgorgement orders in the amount of 
$21.7 million). Re Poonian et al., 2015 BCSECCOM 96 (B.C. Sec. Comm.) resulted in fines of $22.5 million (in addition to 
disgorgement orders in the amount of $7.3 million).
116 
CSA Enforcement Report 2015, 19.
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E.  Securities Regulatory Actions Related to Prospectus Exemptions: Characterization
The bulk of securities regulatory hearings related to prospectus exemptions are not enforcement 
proceedings, but regulatory hearings to decide whether to grant the applicant a discretionary 
prospectus exemption. Below, I summarize a random selection of 100 cases gleaned from the 
Westlaw database.117 All of these cases arise after Jan. 1, 2000 — the date on which the multiple 
reliance review system (MRRS) came into existence.
The MRRS is a mutual recognition system pursuant to which the decision of a single provincial 
regulator (the principal regulator) is binding in the rest of the country.118 It allows a market actor to 
apply to its principal regulator for a discretionary prospectus exemption that will apply nationally.
As can be seen from Table 18, only 11 (or 11 per cent) of the cases in the sample are enforcement 
cases in the strict sense (i.e., disciplinary proceedings related to abuse of the prospectus 
exemptions). Nearly half (46 per cent) of the cases were applications for discretionary exemptions 
made under the MRRS system. The balance (43 per cent) involved applications for discretionary 
exemptions made in a single province.
TABLE 18 MRRS-ERA SECURITIES REGULATORY CASES: A RANDOM SELECTION OF 100 CASES119
TYPE OF CASE NUMBER
Enforcement 11
MRRS Discretionary Exemption 46
Single Province Discretionary Exemption 43123
TOTAL 100
Table 19 supplies a breakdown of the types of applications made for discretionary exemptions 
under the MRRS system. The most common type of application by far is related to the prospectus 
exemption allowing for the sale of non-convertible short-term commercial paper without a 
prospectus. Many of these involved situations in which the issuer’s commercial paper failed to meet 
the rating requirements of the exemption.
Of the 26 applications for relief in connection with the short-term commercial paper exemption, 
19 were from commercial corporations — about two-thirds of which were large publicly 
traded corporations in the energy sector (and all Canadian-based companies). An additional six 
applications were from financial corporations, all of which were financing subsidiaries of large 
publicly traded corporations (mostly American or European). 
117 
The search parameter was “prospectus exemption.” These 100 cases represent about 10 per cent of all of the cases 
concerning prospectus exemptions decided between Jan. 1, 2000 and the present.
118 
See MI 11-101 (“Principal Regulator System”).
119 
One non-MRRS case involved the granting of discretionary exemptions in multiple provinces.
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TABLE 19 MRRS DISCRETIONARY EXEMPTIONS120121
TYPE OF CASE NUMBER
Short-Term Commercial Paper 26124
First Trade Relief for Institutional Investor 5
First Trade Relief for Employees Under Incentive Compensation Plan 4125
Allow Foreign Offering Documents to be Used as OM 3
Mutual Fund Deemed Not a Reporting Issuer 3
Permit Prohibited Representation (Stock Exchange Listing) 3
Related Mutual Funds 2
Registered Retirement Income Fund 1
Designation of Issuer as Reporting Issuer 1
Table 20 indicates the nature of the single-province applications for discretionary exemptions. All 
of the Alberta-only applications in the first row occurred between 2000-2005, and appear to be 
unique to that province and that period of time. The Ontario-only applications in the second row 
all occurred between 2006-2008, and again appear to be unique to that province and that period 
of time. If these applications are not counted, between 2000 and the present 67 per cent of the 
applications for discretionary relief were made under the MRRS system.
TABLE 20 SINGLE PROVINCE DISCRETIONARY EXEMPTIONS
Application by Registrant to Deal in a Specific Security Outside Its Normal Mandate (Alberta) 21
Approval to Act as Trustee Under s.213(3)(b) of the Ontario Loan and Trust Corporations Act (Ontario) 6
First Trade Relief for Institutional Holder 2
First Trade Relief for Employees Under Incentive Compensation Plan 2
Northwest Exemption 2
Purchase of Securities by Employees 1
Defined Contribution Pension Plan 1
Permit Prohibited Representation (Stock Exchange Listing) 1
Permit FOFI to be Used in OM 1
Other 6
Tables 21-26 summarize a random selection of 20 cases dealing specifically with enforcement 
issues, involving the sanctioning of 37 individuals and seven issuer corporations. 
Table 21 presents summary statistics indicating the nature of the illegal acts found to have 
occurred in the cases in the sample involving individuals. All involve the facilitation of an illegal 
distribution. Virtually all of the cases also involve a breach of the registration requirement. This 
is because the securities regulators refer cases involving registrants to the appropriate SRO (e.g., 
IIROC). 
The cases generally fall into a number of camps:
a) An unregistered individual innocently but illegally acts as an agent in facilitating the 
raising of money by an issuer;
b) An unregistered individual knowingly and illegally acts as an agent in facilitating the 
raising of money by an issuer;
120 
The total in this column adds to more than 46, given that more than one type of discretionary relief was requested in some 
applications.
121 These are foreign companies with subsidiaries in Canada that are not reporting issuers and that wish to allow their 
employees to sell incentive shares in a foreign venue without the prospectus requirement.
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c) An unregistered individual who is a director or officer of the issuer innocently but illegally 
facilitates the raising of money by an issuer;
d) An unregistered individual who is a director or officer of the issuer knowingly and illegally 
facilitates the raising of money by an issuer;
e) The distribution is for an issuer actually conducting a real business, but involves fraudulent 
misrepresentations in order to induce investors to part with their money;
f) The distribution involves the raising of money for a phony issuer with the proceeds of the 
distribution going directly or indirectly into the fraudster’s pockets.
As Table 21 indicates, a high percentage (57 per cent) of the cases in the sample in which 
individuals were sanctioned involved fraud of one kind or another. Relatively few of these involved 
frauds with phony issuers. More often, the scheme involved fraudulent misrepresentations with a 
view to inducing persons to invest.
TABLE 21  ILLEGAL ACTS FOUND IN SECURITIES REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS: INDIVIDUALS:  
SUMMARY STATISTICS
ILLEGAL ACTS NUMBER OF CASES PERCENTAGE
1 - no registration 36 of 37 cases 97%
2 - facilitating illegal distribution 37 of 37 cases 100%
3 - making prohibited undertakings 5 of 37 cases 14%
4 - fraud 21 of 37 cases 57%
5 - activity contrary to the public interest 11 of 37 cases 30%
For all 20 cases, Table 22 indicates the monetary sanctions imposed on individuals who were found 
to have been involved in an illegal distribution.122 Both these and the non-monetary sanctions 
arise under the regulators’ so-called public interest powers. Ontario’s Securities Act is typical. As 
indicated in Appendix C, the act enables the commission to make 15 different kinds of orders “if in 
its opinion it is in the public interest to make the order or orders …” Obviously, this confers a broad 
discretionary power on the commission. Moreover, the commission can find that there has been a 
breach of the public interest even in cases in which there has been no violation of the Securities Act 
or any other applicable regulatory instrument.123 
Table 23 indicates the corresponding non-monetary sanctions employed in cases involving 
individuals. As noted, like the monetary sanctions, these sanctions arise under the regulators’ 
public interest powers.
Table 24 indicates the relative frequency with which the different sanctions are used. In the case of 
the monetary penalties, the average amount of all fines, costs and disbursement orders is indicated. 
There are no amounts in the reimbursement category, because in the cases in the sample the funds 
used to reimburse investors are drawn from the disgorgement orders.
122 Some sanctions have been omitted, such as reprimands.
123 Canadian Tire Corp. vs. C.T.C. Dealer Holdings Ltd. (1987), 35 B.L.R. 117, 37 D.L.R. (4th) 94, 3 A.C.W.S. (3d) 443, 59 O.R. 
(2d) 79 (Ont. Div. Ct.). A subset of the public interest sanctions may only be enlisted in cases involving a breach of Ontario 
securities law, a defined term which includes a breach of the Securities Act, rules or regulations made under the act, and 
“in respect of a person or company, a decision of the Commission or a Director to which the person or company is subject” 
(Securities Act, ss.1(1), definition of “Ontario securities law”). Given the last part of this definition, this does not appear 
to require a violation of the Securities Act, or the rules or regulations. The director, for example, is given discretionary 
authority under the act to decide various matters not involving a breach of the act. Perhaps more important, a decision by 
the commission that a person or company has violated the public interest would appear to be “a decision of the Commission 
… to which the person or company is subject.” This is not an issue, however, in the enforcement cases described herein, 
insofar as the respondents routinely breach either or both of s.25 of the act (requiring that persons engaged in “trading” be 
registered) and s.53 (requiring a prospectus for a distribution of securities, or an applicable exemption).
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In the case of discretionary bans (such as a prohibition of acting as an officer or director of an 
issuer or other party) Table 21 indicates whether the sanction was permanent (Y (P)), or for a period 
of years (Y (x), where x is the number of years).
TABLE 22 INDIVIDUAL MONETARY SANCTIONS: SECURITIES REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS
Individual Nature of Illegal Acts Fine128 Costs129 Reimbursement of Investors130 Disgorgement131
1 1, 2 $150,000 $0 YES $486,000
2 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 $200,000 $33,470 $165,000
3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 $500,000 $33,470 $165,000
4 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 $650,000 $33,470 $165,000
5 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 $750,000 $33,470 $165,000
6 1, 2, 5 $7,500 $0 YES $163,000
7 1, 2 $50,000 $5,000 $0
8 1,2 $0 $0 $0
9 1,2 $25,000 $5,000 YES $887,500
10 1,2 $27,710 $0 $0
11 1, 2 $0 $0 $0
12 1, 2 $25,000 $25,000 $0
13 1, 2, 7 $200,000 $25,000 $0
14 1, 2, 5 $10,000 $10,000 $0
15 1, 2, 5 $10,000 $0 $0
16 1, 2, 4 $550,000 $38,300 $0
17 1, 2, 4 $550,000 $38,300 $0
18 1, 2, 4 $300,000 $30,000 $0
19 1, 2, 4 $15,000 $30,000 $0
20 1, 2, 4 $2,500 $5,000 $0
21 1, 2, 4 $2,500 $0 $0
22 1, 2, 4 $2,500 $0 $0
23 1, 2, 4 $2,500 $0 $0
24 1, 2, 4 $2,500 $0 $0
25 1, 2, 4 $2,500 $0 $0
26 1, 2, 4 $2,500 $0 $0
27 1, 2, 4 $2,500 $0 $0
28 2, 3, 5 $7,500 $1,000 $0
29 1, 2, 5 $0 $0 $1,500
30 1, 2, 5 $50,000 $25,000 $50,000
31 1, 2, 4, 5 $6,000,000 $0 $1,297,581
32 1, 2 $0 $0 $0
33 1, 2 $0 $0 $0
34 1, 2, 4 $20,000 $0 $0
35 1, 2, 4 $20,000 $0 $0
36 1, 2, 4 $20,000 $0 $0
37 1, 2, 4 $20,000 $0 $0
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LEGEND
1 no registration
2 facilitating illegal distribution
3 making prohibited undertakings
4 fraud
5 activity contrary to the public interest
6 failure to ensure that investors were accredited
TABLE 23 INDIVIDUAL NON-MONETARY SANCTIONS: SECURITIES REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS124125126127
Individual Personal  Trading Ban132
Resign Position as Director/Officer of 
Issuer, Registrant and/or Investment 
Fund Manager133
Barred From Serving as Director/
Officer of Issuer, Registrant and/or 
Investment Fund Manager134
Barred From  
Becoming a Registrant135
1 Y (P) Y Y (P) Y (P)
2 Y (P) Y Y (P) Y (P)
3 Y (P) Y Y (P) Y (P)
4 Y (P) Y Y (P) Y (P)
5 Y (P) Y Y (P) Y (P)
6 Y (P) N Y (P) Y (P)
7 Y (1) N N N
8 Y(5) Y Y (P) N
9 Y(P) N Y (P) N
10 Y(3) N N N
11 N Y Y (5) Y (P)
12 N N N N
13 N Y Y (P) Y (4)
14 Y(P) Y Y(10) N
15 N N Y(3) N
16 Y(P) Y Y (P) Y (P)
17 Y(P) Y Y (P) Y (P)
18 Y(P) Y Y (P) Y (P)
19 Y(5) Y Y (5) N
20 Y(4) Y Y (4) N
21 Y(4) Y Y (4) N
22 Y(2) Y Y (2) N
23 Y(2) Y Y (2) N
24 Y(2) Y Y (2) N
25 Y(2) Y Y (2) N
26 Y(2) Y Y (2) N
27 Y(2) Y Y (2) N
124 
The Ontario provisions are: OSA ss.127(1)2.1 (barring acquisition of securities); ss.127(1)3 (an order that none of the 
exemptions contained in Ontario securities law shall be available to the person or company).
125 
The Ontario provisions are: OSA ss.127(1)7 (resign as director or officer of issuer); ss. 127(1)8.1 (resign as director or 
officer of a registrant); ss.127(1)8.3 (resign as director or officer of an investment fund manager).
126 
The Ontario provisions are: OSA ss.127(1)8 (barred from serving as director or officer of issuer); ss. 127(1)8.2 (barred 
from serving as director or officer of a registrant); ss. 127(1)8.4 (barred from serving as director or officer of an 
investment fund manager).
127 
The Ontario provision is OSA ss.127(1)8.5.
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28 Y(20) N Y (20) Y (20)
29 Y(7) N Y (7) Y (7)
30 Y(P) N Y (7) Y (7)
31 N N Y (P) Y (P)
32 N N N Y (5)
33 Y(5) Y Y(5) Y (4)
34 Y (P) N Y (P) N
35 Y (P) N Y (P) N
36 Y (P) N Y (P) N
37 Y (P) N Y (P) N
TABLE 24 INDIVIDUAL SANCTIONS: SUMMARY STATISTICS128
TYPE OF SANCTION: INDIVIDUALS NUMBER OF CASES (AND %) AVERAGE
Fine 32 of 37 cases (86%)
$275,100 (all cases) 
 
$318,100 (in cases awarded)
Costs 16 of 37 cases (43%)
$10,040 (all cases) 
 
$23,200 (in cases awarded)
Reimbursement 3 of 37 cases (8%) N/A
Disgorgement 10 of 37 cases (27%)
$71,840 (all cases) 
 
$265,800 (in cases awarded)
Personal Trading Suspension or Ban 31 of 37 cases (84%) N/A
Resign Positions as Director/Officer Etc. 22 of 37 cases (59%) N/A
Prohibition From Acting as Director/Officer Etc. 33 of 37 cases (89%) N/A
Preventive Order that the Individual May Not 
Become a Registrant for a Period of Time or 
Permanently
17 of 37 cases (46%) N/A136
All 20 of the cases in the sample involved corporate issuers (some, a significant number). However, 
in only seven of these cases were sanctions levied against these issuers. The main targets of 
enforcement proceedings are typically the individuals involved.
As can be seen from Table 25, the main sanctions levied against corporations are monetary (as 
opposed to a combination of monetary and non-monetary in the case of individuals). An additional 
type of order sometimes levied against an issuer, particularly in cases involving fraud, is a cease 
trade order, such that no person may trade in the securities of the offending issuer.
128 
An average may not be computed given the indefinite nature of the permanent bans.
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TABLE 25 SECURITIES REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS: CORPORATE SANCTIONS129130131132133
Corporation Nature of Illegal Acts137 Fine
138 Costs139 Reimbursement  of Investors140 Disgorgement
141 Other
1 1, 2 $25,000 $0 Y $887,500
2 1, 2 $800,000 $0 N $0
3 1, 2 $25,000 $25,000 N $0
Corporation to offer right 
or rescission to all investors 
who are not accredited
4 $500,000 $0 N $0
Issuer undertakes to sell 
to investors only under a 
specific exemption
5 1, 2, 4 $550,000 $38,300 N $0
6 1, 2 $10,000 $5,000 N $0
Corporation to offer right 
or rescission to all investors 
who are not accredited
Corporation loses trading 
exemptions for 7 years
Corporation to prepare 
audited financial 
statements for regulator
7 1, 2, 4 $20,000 $0 N $0
TABLE 26 CORPORATE MONETARY SANCTIONS: SUMMARY STATISTICS
TYPE OF SANCTION: INDIVIDUALS NUMBER OF CASES (AND %) AVERAGE
Fine 7 of 7 (100%) $275,715
Costs 3 of 7 (43%) $9,760 (all cases)$22,770 (in cases awarded)
Reimbursement 0 of 7 (0%) $0
Disgorgement 1 of 7 (14%) $126,785
The corporate sample is small. Nonetheless, as a comparison of tables 24 and 26 indicates, the 
average fine levied against individuals was approximately the same as the average fine levied 
against corporations. While costs were ordered much more frequently against individuals than 
corporations, the average amount of the fines awarded was very similar both overall and in respect 
of only those cases in which costs were ordered.
One conclusion to be drawn from the above statistics is that the securities regulators have chosen 
to focus more on sanctions directed against individuals involved in illegal distributions than on the 
issuers. This seems appropriate, insofar as not all of the shareholders of an issuer may be complicit 
in violations of the distribution rules, and sanctions directed at the issuer penalize the innocent as 
much as the guilty.
The number of different types of sanctions against individuals is greater than that against issuers. 
In addition to monetary sanctions, it is commonplace with respect to individuals to order a ban 
on personal trading, either for a period of years, or permanently. It is also common to order that 
the individual resign any position that he/she holds as director or officer of an issuer, and/or an 
129 
The coding follows that found in Table 21.
130 
In Ontario, an administrative fine of up to $1 million may be imposed for each failure to comply. OSA ss.127(1)9.
131 
In Ontario, the costs of an investigation may be awarded under OSA s.127.1.
132 
In Ontario, reimbursement of investors is an outgrowth of the commission’s powers under ss.127(1)10  to order disgorgement 
of illicit gains (“If a person or company has not complied with Ontario securities law, an order requiring the person or 
company to disgorge to the Commission any amounts obtained as a result of the non-compliance.”).  These amounts may 
then be applied for the benefit of third parties designated by the commission: OSC s.3.4(2)(b).
133 
In Ontario, disgorgement may be awarded under ss.127(1)10.  See preceding footnote.
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investment fund manager, and/or a registrant, and to refrain from becoming a director or officer of 
one or more of these entities either for a period of years or for life.
The severity of the sanctions meted out is clear from the above tables. The severity is understated 
insofar as the monetary sanctions typically exceed by a factor of several times the amount of the 
individual’s ill-gotten gains in the cases in the sample. If, as I have conjectured, the amount of 
non-compliance with the rules is far greater than regulators are (or can be) aware of, meting out 
severe sanctions is obviously an appropriate remedial strategy in order to discourage potential 
abuse of the rules. 
F. Comparison of IIROC and Securities Regulatory Disciplinary Proceedings
A comparison between the sanctions meted out by securities regulators and those meted out by 
IIROC discloses a wide gap in severity. The average fine awarded by the securities regulators 
against an individual, for example, was $275,100, while that awarded by IIROC was just over 
$40,000. Similarly, the average disgorgement award against an individual awarded by IIROC was 
$3,450, versus about $72,000 for the securities regulators. While on average IIROC levied about 
$17,000 costs per individual and the securities regulators about $10,000, this does not come close to 
making up the gap in fines or disgorgement amounts.
In the cases in the sample, in both IIROC and securities regulatory proceedings, reimbursement 
of investors plays a small role. A broader survey of securities regulatory cases, however, suggests 
that reimbursement may occur more often than indicated in the cases in the sample. Regulators 
are legally entitled to order reimbursement of investors out of either the administrative fine or 
disgorgement amount.134 It is not unusual for regulators to order that the administrative fine be 
employed for the benefit of third parties in general, and investors in particular.135
In terms of non-monetary sanctions, the focus of IIROC and securities regulatory proceedings 
is quite different. IIROC deals with registrants that have acted inappropriately, while securities 
regulators deal with non-registrants (both individuals facilitating illegal distributions and the 
issuers themselves). This conditions the types of sanctions available, since registrants may be 
disciplined qua registrants, while non-registrants may not. The regulatory solution in the latter case 
is to allow regulators to penalize respondents in non-registrant but business-related activities, such 
as being a director or officer of an issuer, investment fund manager or registrant.
In IIROC cases involving individuals, the non-monetary sanctions typically involve one or more 
of: i) a suspension or lifetime ban from acting as a registrant; ii) an order to retake the industry’s 
foundational educational requirement, the Conduct and Practices Handbook course; iii) close 
supervision by the individual’s employer for a period of time. IIROC non-monetary sanctions 
sometimes require the firm to reassess and rewrite its supervisory rules and protocols.
In securities regulatory cases involving individuals, the non-monetary sanctions typically involve 
one or more of: i) a personal trading suspension or ban; ii) an order that the individual resign all 
positions as a director or officer of any issuer, investment fund manager or registrant; iii) an order 
that the individual is prohibited from acting as a director or officer of any of the foregoing; iv) a 
preventive ban from becoming a registrant for a period of years or permanently.
134 
In Ontario, see OSA ss.3.4(2)(b).
135 See e.g., Re Global Partners Capital (2011), 34 OSCB 10023; Re McCarthy (2014), 37 OSCB 5639; Re White (2010), 33 
O.S.C.B. 8893.
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There are a variety of potential explanations for the substantial difference in the severity of IIROC 
and securities regulatory sanctions. These include the following:
a) The cases dealt with by securities regulators tend to involve a higher level of seriously 
abusive conduct, including fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulently passing oneself 
off as a registrant;
b) The cases dealt with by securities regulators tend to involve significantly greater investor 
losses;
c) IIROC is restricted to disciplining registrants, while the securities regulators are not (and 
thus have a larger field of persons against whom sanctions may be meted out);
d) The gains realized by a broker on an illegal distribution (a commission) are much less than 
the gains realized by the management of an issuer (continuing employment, protection of 
existing equity holdings, opportunities for defalcation);136
e) IIROC, which is an industry-run SRO, is reluctant to mete out serious sanctions to its 
members, which are responsible for its financial maintenance. 
The difference in sanctions may also be an artifact of the incompleteness of the IIROC online case 
database; it may be that the posted cases are not a representative sample of all IIROC disciplinary 
proceedings (i.e., IIROC has posted cases with relatively minor harm involved). Further 
investigation is warranted.
G. Court Cases Dealing With Prospectus Exemptions
There are many cases involving civil actions related to faulty usage of the prospectus exemptions. 
The plaintiff in these cases is almost invariably a retail investor who has lost money as a result of 
purchasing prospectus-exempt investments that performed poorly. The situations mirror the IIROC 
and securities regulatory cases noted above; i.e., the plaintiff is typically:
a) A client of a registrant firm suing the investment advisor and/or firm for failing to carry out 
their KYC and suitability duties properly;
b) An investor who was enticed to invest in prospectus-exempt securities by a person who 
purported to be a registrant but was not;
c) An investor who was enticed to invest in prospectus-exempt securities by virtue of 
misrepresentations by an agent of the issuer or by the issuer itself;
d) A fraudulent scheme to raise money for a non-existent issuer.
These cases are virtually always much more complicated than either the IIROC or securities 
regulatory cases noted above. In cases involving a registrant, the legal grounds for seeking 
relief are typically negligence, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent 
misrepresentation and/or breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, the cases involve complex inquiries 
into such matters as whether the client was induced to invest by misrepresentation; whether the 
KYC process was appropriately conducted (e.g., the quality of the due diligence performed by 
the registrant); the accuracy and sufficiency of the account documentation; whether the registrant 
carried out its duty to inform the client of the risks of the proposed investment plan; whether the 
suitability duty was properly carried out; whether broad-textured rules setting out the standard 
136 
This point was suggested by an anonymous referee (whom I have quoted word-for-word).
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of behaviour expected of registrants were observed;137 the nature of the relationship between the 
registrant and the investor; the extent of supervision exercised over the investment advisor by the 
firm’s compliance department and management personnel; the adequacy of the firm’s supervisory 
protocols; whether industry rules and/or securities regulatory requirements were breached; whether 
the registrant had a conflict of interest; whether there was contributory negligence; whether the 
plaintiff appropriately mitigated his/her losses; whether the plaintiff ratified the trades that the 
registrant performed; whether aggravated or punitive damages should be awarded; the disposition 
of costs; whether to award pre-judgment interest; and whether the plaintiff’s base loss should be 
scaled up by a market index factor.138 This complexity does not easily lend itself to the generation 
of case statistics.
Cases involving non-registrants are sometimes relatively easy for the plaintiff to make out, insofar 
as the legal issues are relatively straightforward and the pertinent facts easily proven. This is true, 
for example, in cases involving non-registrants passing themselves off as registrants, insofar as 
this constitutes a fraudulent misrepresentation that is usually sufficient by itself for the plaintiff 
to succeed. Cases involving a fraudulent scheme to raise money for non-existent issuers are also 
legally straightforward and relatively easy to prove. The main difficulty in such cases is tracing the 
misappropriated funds so that the plaintiff can actually achieve a recovery.
While cases involving registrant defendants tend to be far more legally and factually complicated, 
they do have one saving grace; at least one of the defendants will typically be an investment firm 
with a deep pocket from whom recovery may easily be effected once a favourable verdict has 
been achieved.
Whatever the source of the plaintiff’s losses, however, and whether a registrant is or is not involved, 
civil litigation is very expensive. It is not unusual for the plaintiff to incur costs in the hundreds 
of thousands of dollars (and very few of these claims are sufficiently large to entice a lawyer to 
accept them on a contingency fee basis). If the plaintiff loses, then under the costs rule that prevails 
in Canada, the plaintiff will usually be ordered to pay a significant proportion of the winning 
side’s costs.139 Even if the plaintiff wins, in the usual case, he/she/it will have to bear about half of 
their own costs. Thus, litigation tends to be an option only in cases involving stakes that are large 
relative to the prospective costs and risks, and only then for plaintiffs with sufficient cash flow to 
carry them through the litigation process, which typically extends over a period of many years.
Added to this is the risk that attends any commercial litigation; non-specialist judges frequently 
decide such cases, which is likely to lead to a relatively high error rate. 
Those who have lost money due to the misuse of prospectus exemptions, particularly in cases 
involving relatively small stakes, are thus well advised to complain to IIROC or the securities 
regulators and hope that a hearing will be held in which a reimbursement order will be made 
(although as noted, the cases in the test sample involved relatively few of these orders).
H. Non-Uniformity of Prospectus Exemptions
An ongoing problem with the prospectus exemptions that is both a policy and an enforcement 
issue is the prevalence of local variations in the body of prospectus exemptions. This variation 
137 
These include the “ethical conduct” rule the “just and equitable” rule, the “not detrimental to the industry” rule, the 
“conduct unbecoming” rule, the “public interest” rule, the “good business practice” rule, the “fairly, honestly and in good 
faith” rule, the “absolute trustworthiness” rule, and whether the registrant appropriately discharged its gatekeeper role. See 
generally Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Brokers’ Duties to Their Clients (forthcoming, LexisNexis Canada).
138 See MacIntosh, Brokers’ Duties … 
139 
The costs order may be partial indemnity, which typically requires the losing party to pay about half of the winning side’s 
costs, or full indemnity, which typically requires the losing party to pay about 80 per cent of the winning side’s costs.
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arises both from differences in the ostensibly national exemptions found in NI 45-106 and from the 
existence of non-national exemptions arising only in one or a subset of the provinces and territories.
In the former category, the OM exemption has three different variations across the country (see 
Table 7). While it is subject to the passport system, the issuer does not have the luxury of choosing 
its principal regulator at large. Rather, the issuer’s choice of principal regulator is determined by the 
location of its head office.140 Since the principal regulator applies the rules that prevail in its own 
jurisdiction, this creates considerable national variation in the nature of the offering memorandum 
exemption available to different issuers.
The OM exemption is far from unique in this regard. Other ostensibly national exemptions with 
local variations (all digested in Table 7) include:
• accredited investor (three variations)
• private issuer (two variations)
• FFBA (three variations)
• government debt securities (two variations)
• institutional debt securities (two variations)
• incentive compensation plans (two variations)
• self-directed registered educational savings plans (two variations)
• investment funds administered by a trust corporation (two variations)
• mortgage broker/dealers (three variations)
• secured debt registered under personal property security legislation (two variations)
In addition, as noted, some of the exemptions apply only in certain jurisdictions. This includes, 
for example, Ontario’s government incentive security exemption. The so-called northwestern 
exemption141 applies only in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, the Northwest 
Territories, Nunavut and the Yukon (with two variations). The crowdfunding exemption applies 
only in Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan142 (with 
three variations).
The variation of exemptions in different jurisdictions creates uncertainty for both market actors 
and enforcement personnel. It also creates heightened transaction costs for issuers and investors. 
In a non-trivial number of cases, issuers must expend time and money to determine which local 
exemptions — or which version of one or more national exemptions — are available. 
Barring an agreement on complete national uniformity, which does not seem likely, one way to 
address this problem would be to allow issuers to choose their principal regulator. This would result 
in greater certainty for market actors in addition to creating something close to a de facto national 
regime of prospectus exemptions.
140 
MI 11-102, s.3.1. If the head office is not located in a jurisdiction that is permitted to be a principal regulator, then the 
principal regulator is located in the jurisdiction with the most significant connection with the issuer.
141 
The northwestern exemption allows unregistered persons or companies to act as capital finders for companies when using 
one of four categories of prospectus-exempt trades: accredited investor; minimum amount; FFBA; or the OM exemption.
142 
MI 45-108.
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Earlier, I conjectured that enforcement issues are most likely to arise in connection with 
prospectus-exempt securities sold to retail buyers, due to the following:
a) proxy slippage
b) investor self-misidentification
c) registrant-induced misidentification
d) issuer or intermediary misrepresentation of investment characteristics
e) low frequency of repeat players
f) high frequency of “take it or leave it” as opposed to negotiated offerings
The cases canvassed in this paper strongly support the hypothesis that problems are most likely 
to arise in the case of retail investors. Proxy slippage, however, is an issue that tends to arise only 
where a market intermediary is involved. If there is no wrongdoing on the part of the issuer and no 
intermediary involved, the risk of proxy slippage falls on the investor, since there is no legal ground 
for a recovery should the investment perform badly. In this case, proxy slippage is a policy issue 
and not an enforcement issue. 
Where a registrant is involved, however, proxy slippage becomes an enforcement issue, as 
registrants are impressed with KYC and suitability duties and may find themselves liable for poor 
investment results even if the client was formally qualified to invest in the prospectus exempt 
financing. Given the important gatekeeper role of intermediaries, it is obviously important to 
strictly enforce the full panoply of duties that registrants owe to their clients.
The cases canvassed suggest that securities regulators levy much more significant penalties than 
their SRO counterpart — IIROC — in sanctioning misuse of the exemptions. I have suggested a 
variety of benign explanations. Nonetheless, further investigation is warranted. 
Misidentification of a non-qualified investor as qualified clearly raises enforcement issues. The 
bulk of these cases arise from induced misidentification rather than self-misidentification. Induced 
misrepresentation involves seriously aberrant conduct on the part of a market intermediary, and the 
comparative leniency of IIROC tribunals gives some cause for concern. 
Cases involving misrepresentation of the investment arise in both brokered and non-brokered 
offerings, although this type of problem appears to be more common when no intermediary is 
involved.
One of the most important results from the data is conspicuous by its absence: namely, disciplinary 
cases involving exempt market dealers (EMDs). EMDs, which are permitted in all jurisdictions, 
may participate only in prospectus-exempt financings. Like investment dealers, they are impressed 
with KYC and suitability duties. However, unlike investment dealers, they are not required to 
belong to IIROC or any other SRO, and none exists for EMDs. This almost certainly reduces both 
the quality of monitoring and the likelihood of discipline should the dealer misbehave.
The absence of an EMD SRO does not mean that EMDs are unregulated. Responsibility for 
regulatory oversight falls to the securities regulators, who conduct ad hoc compliance reviews of 
EMDs with a view to determining whether the dealer is in compliance with its KYC and suitability 
duties and other broad-textured duties to its clients and the marketplace. Nonetheless, the absence 
of an SRO for EMDs, coupled with the lack of cases disciplining EMDs, suggests that this might 
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constitute a lacuna in the enforcement apparatus. Securities regulators should give serious 
consideration to requiring the creation of an SRO for EMDs.143
Properly addressing both the descriptive and normative dimensions of the prospectus exemptions is 
hampered by the lack of comprehensive empirical data. We still have only a very general picture of 
which issuers and investors use the exemptions, for what purposes, in what amounts, and with what 
level of returns to investors. Without these data, it is very difficult to know if the existing stable 
of exemptions enhances or inhibits the achievement of allocative efficiency and the protection of 
investors, and whether enforcement resources are being properly deployed. Regulators need to 
make a much more concerted effort to gather pertinent data.
On the normative side, many of the exemptions are based upon an idea — investor protection — 
that has never been rigorously defined by the regulators. It could mean any of a number of things. 
Investor protection might, for example, be entirely congruent with the financial economist’s notion 
of a fair game, in which investors earn, on average, what they expect to earn. However, a market 
can be a fair game with very different degrees of variation around the mean (i.e., a low or a high 
standard deviation of returns). Thus, investor protection can also be conceived in terms not only of 
yielding a fair game, but of limiting the risk to which investors are exposed. There are many other 
possible interpretations and it would be helpful if the regulators were to define with greater precision 
what they mean by investor protection. It would also be helpful to indicate the relationship of 
investor protection to the other goals of securities regulation, namely market efficiency, fairness, and 
investor confidence in securities markets (and which of these takes precedence if there is conflict).
The exemptions are not based on a single rationale. While investor protection dominates, there are 
a variety of other rationales, including the enhancement of capital formation subject to investor 
protection concerns. However, the latter are not based on any systematic understanding of where 
capital gaps occur in Canadian capital markets. To the extent that enforcement resources are 
invested in policing exemptions whose underlying motivation is questionable, they are diverted 
away from policing other more important and better-motivated exemptions that make a much 
greater contribution to capital market efficiency. 
The wide gulf between the high level of regulatory demands (and associated cost) of the prospectus 
requirement and the modest (or essentially non-existent) regulatory demands of many of the 
prospectus exemptions suggests some discontinuity in empirical assumptions and theoretical 
justifications. That is, the distribution of funding options tends to be bipolar; either investors are 
assumed to be highly sophisticated and in need of few or no regulatory protections, or completely 
unsophisticated and in need of a very high level of protection.144 Particularly given the very high 
regulatory cost of a public offering by prospectus, it would seem to be appropriate to re-examine 
whether the extraordinary level of disclosure required in a prospectus is really cost effective.
The extraordinary costs and risks of civil litigation put such litigation out of the reach of most retail 
investors who have suffered losses from the misbehaviour of others (whether registrants or non-
registrants). This is a serious failing in our system of justice, and allows many defalcations and 
investor predations to go unaddressed. The obvious solution is for both the securities regulators and 
the SROs to be far more aggressive in employing reimbursement orders than at present. 
143 
An anonymous referee suggested that many EMDs are pooled investment funds that invest predominantly in real estate 
products, and that the risky nature of these products may constitute the principal source of investor defaults. If so, it 
suggests that EMDs are not adequately discharging their KYC and suitability duties — either because they are aware of 
the risks and not properly screening clients and/or communicating these risks, or they are failing their know-your-product 
obligation (which is an integral part of the suitability obligation).
144 
As I have noted, the hybrid exemptions fall somewhere in between, although typically close to the low regulation end of the 
spectrum.
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In closing, whether the enforcement efforts described in this paper are sufficient to address 
abuses associated with the prospectus exemptions is unclear. By and large, enforcement efforts 
appear to be directed at the right targets. Nonetheless, whether the fines and punishments meted 
out are adequate to deter wrongdoers remains an open question. It is likely that there will never 
be definitive answers. If there are indeed something in the vicinity of 156,000 non-prospectus 
financings per year in Canada, mostly by small, unsophisticated business enterprises selling 
securities to investors who are not legally advised, it would be surprising if there were not a far 
greater number of abuses than are reflected in the relatively small number of cases that actually 
come to the attention of IIROC, the securities regulators, and the courts. Indeed, if most enterprises 
and investors participating in the exempt market are not legally advised, we would posit a region 
of disconnect between enforcement sanctions and the deterrent effect resulting from those 
enforcement actions. Sanctions are most likely to have the most potent deterrent effect in relation 
to repeat players such as registrants, and it may make sense to concentrate enforcement efforts on 
these types of market actors.
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APPENDIX A
A SELECTION OF PROSPECTUS EXEMPTIONS
Table 1, compiled by the Ontario Securities Commission,145 summarizes the features of some of the 
more widely used prospectus exemptions, all of which have recently been amended by the Ontario 
Securities Commission and the Canadian Securities Administrators. These are discussed further 
below.
 
(Source: Ontario Securities Commission, “Summary of Key Capital Raising Prospectus Exemptions in Ontario: January 28,  
2016,” 3, available at https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4/ni_20160128_45-106_key-capital-
prospectus-exemptions.pdf)
A. The Accredited Investor Exemption
1. How it Works
The accredited investor exemption uses proxies to identify classes of investors that are thought to 
be sufficiently sophisticated to be able to protect their own interests when purchasing securities 
without the benefit of a prospectus. Self-protection might take place through a variety of 
mechanisms or combination of mechanisms, including the ability to demand pertinent information 
from the issuer, and the ability to effectively evaluate the worth of an offered security given what is 
known and what is not known about the issuer.
145 
Ontario Securities Commission, “Summary Of Key Capital Raising Prospectus Exemptions In Ontario: January 28, 2016,” 
available at https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4/ni_20160128_45-106_key-capital-prospectus-
exemptions.pdf. 
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These proxies include:146
a) Institutional investors such as banks and other financial institutions, trust companies, 
pension funds, mutual funds (whether qualified by prospectus or selling only to accredited 
investors), and any other kind of institutional investor holding at least $5 million in net 
assets (other than a mutual fund);
b) Governments and agents of governments, including Canadian federal, provincial and 
municipal governments, foreign governments, Crown corporations, public boards and 
commissions, and school boards;
c) Registrants such as advisors and dealers;
d) Corporations and other entities (other than mutual funds) with net assets of at least $5 
million;
e) Anyone else whom the securities regulators choose to recognize as an accredited investor.
Individual investors may qualify as accredited investors based on their financial assets (a defined 
term that includes only cash and securities), net assets or net income.147
2. Rationale Underlying the Accredited Investor Exemption
The accredited investor exemption is based on the sophistication rationale.
B. The $150,000 Exemption
1. How it Works
The $150,000 exemption qualifies any non-individual who is investing $150,000 or more in an 
offering of securities to purchase without the benefit of a prospectus.
2. Rationale Underlying the $150,000 Exemption
The $150,000 exemption has historically been available to both individual and non-individual 
investors, and has been supported by the sophistication rationale, on the theory that investors who 
are able to put $150,000 into a single investment must be well-heeled and therefore sophisticated. 
For obvious reasons, this premise has often been questioned, and NI 45-106 was recently amended 
to make it unavailable to individuals.
146 
NI 45-106, s.1.1 (definition of accredited investor).
147 
Per NI 45-106, s.1.1, qualifying individual investors are:
   (j)  an individual who, either alone or with a spouse, beneficially owns financial assets having an aggregate realizable 
value that before taxes, but net of any related liabilities, exceeds $1,000,000,
   (k)  an individual whose net income before taxes exceeded $200,000 in each of the 2 most recent calendar years or whose 
net income before taxes combined with that of a spouse exceeded $300,000 in each of the 2 most recent calendar years 
and who, in either case, reasonably expects to exceed that net income level in the current calendar year;
   (l)  an individual who, either alone or with a spouse, has net assets of at least $5,000,000.
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C. The Private Issuer Exemption
1. How It Works
The private issuer exemption148 is illustrative of a number of the various rationales for prescribing 
prospectus exemptions. Under this exemption:
(i) The issuer must be a private company;
(ii) The number of shareholders (not including employees and former employees) cannot 
exceed 50;
(iii) The shares must be subject to restrictions on transferability.
If these requirements are met, then securities can be sold without a prospectus to a number of 
different classes of purchasers that fall roughly into the following camps:
a) Insiders
The categories of qualifying persons include directors, officers, employees, founders and control 
persons of the issuer as well as directors, officers and employees of an affiliate of the issuer.149
b) Close Relatives of Insiders
Also included are close relatives of the categories of persons just noted.150
c) Close Personal Friends and Business Associates of Insiders
A person who is a close personal friend or close business associate of persons with an intimate 
knowledge of the issuer is a permissible purchaser.151
d) Existing Security Holders of the Issuer
A person who is already a security holder of the issuer is a permissible purchaser.152
e) Accredited Investors
Accredited investors are permissible purchasers.153
f) Secondary Market Transferees Closely Connected to Shareholders of the Company
Several of the permissible classes of purchasers have been defined so as to allow secondary market 
transfers of securities. These include close relatives of the selling security holder or the selling 
148 
NI 45-106, s.2.4.
149 
NI 45-106, s.2.4(2)(a), (b).
150 
NI 45-106, s.2.4(2)(c) and (d) are:
   (c)  a spouse, parent, grandparent, brother, sister, child or grandchild of a director, executive officer, founder or control 
person of the issuer;
   (d)  a parent, grandparent, brother, sister, child or grandchild of the spouse of a director, executive officer, founder or 
control person of the issuer …
151 
NI 45-106, s.2.4(2)(e) and (f) are:
   (e)  a close personal friend of a director, executive officer, founder or control person of the issuer,
   (f)  a close business associate of a director, executive officer, founder or control person of the issuer …
152 
NI 45-106, s.2.4(2)(h).
153 
NI 45-106, s.2.4(2)(i).
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security holder’s spouse,154 trusts or estates whose owners are permissible purchasers155 and 
corporations that are controlled by permissible purchasers.156
g) Persons Who are Not the Public
Persons who are not the public are also permissible purchasers. This is a residual category that 
draws on established case law defining who is and who is not the public in relation to a given issuer. 
Two different tests have emerged with respect to whether a person is a member of the public. The 
“need to know” test is “whether the particular class of persons affected need the protection of the 
Act”157 based on factors such as access to company information and sophistication. The second — 
the “common bonds of interest or association” test — is based on whether the purchaser has such 
common bonds of interest or association with a person or persons who have access to the sort of 
information that would be contained in a prospectus.158
2. Rationales Underlying the Private Issuer Exemption
The private company exemption is not answerable to any single exemption rationale. Accredited 
investors fit under the sophistication rationale. Insiders fit under the active participants rationale. 
Relatives, close personal friends and close business associates fit under the close connections 
rationale, as do persons who are already security holders. Depending on which test one adopts of 
who is and who is not the public, the granting of an exemption to a person who is not the public fits 
under either the sophistication rationale or the close connections rationale. The inclusion of secondary 
market transferees is to some extent justified by the close connections rationale, and is partly an 
administrative convenience to facilitate transfers from one legal form to another (while preserving 
the locus of beneficial ownership or transferring it to persons closely connected with insiders).
This shows that there is likely to be a high degree of variance in the characteristics of persons 
using the private issuer exemption. Even within individual categories, such as those who purchase 
under the close connections rationale, there will be a high degree of variance. Some will likely 
be given fulsome disclosure, while — no matter how close the ties between the entrepreneur and 
these investors — others will receive extremely modest disclosure about the entrepreneur’s plans 
and the risks of the enterprise. Many of the latter ilk will invest on the strength of their ties to the 
entrepreneur alone, and will lack even the barest understanding of how to evaluate a prospective 
investment or the entrepreneur’s chances of success.
It is thus not surprising that, in the financing trade, friends and family are often lumped together 
under the rubric of “love capital” investors. They invest not because they are sophisticated, or 
because the securities are inherently safe, or because their interests are otherwise protected, but 
simply out of love and affection (or at least friendship) and a desire to help a friend or family 
member down the road toward success.
154 
NI 45-106, s.2.4(2)(g).
155 
NI 45-106, s.2.4(2)(k).
156 
NI 45-106, s.2.4(2)(j).
157 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), at 125.
158 R. v. Piepgrass (1959) 29 WWR 218; R. v. Buck River Resources Ltd., (1984) 25 BLR 209.
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D. The Friends, Family and Business Associates (FFBA) Exemption
1. How it Works
The persons eligible to take advantage of the FFBA exemption are essentially the same as those 
who are eligible to participate in an offering under the private issuer exemption.159 However, under 
the private issuer exemption, the issuer must be a private issuer, as that term is defined, which 
requires that the issuer be a private company,, that there are restrictions on the transferability of 
non-debt securities, and that the issuer has no more than 50 shareholders (with some exclusions). 
By contrast, any issuer may use the FFBA. 
2. Rationales Underlying the FFBA Exemption
The FFBA exemption is motivated by the same rationales that underpin the private issuer exemption.
E. The Offering Memorandum Exemption
1. How it Works
The offering memorandum (OM) exemption is in fact a hybrid between a prospectus offering and 
an exempt offering, insofar as use of the OM requires mandated disclosure, albeit considerably less 
than that which is required in a prospectus. All companies may use the exemption and all investors 
may purchase under the exemption. However, in addition to mandated disclosure, there are other 
investor protections that are absent under such exemptions as the accredited investor exemption, 
the private issuer exemption and the FFBA. Thus, for example, investors have withdrawal rights,, 
misrepresentation certificates are required,, the purchaser must sign a risk acknowledgment form, 
and the securities acquired under the exemption are subject to first-trade resale restrictions.
In addition, in some provinces and territories, there are caps on the amount that may be invested. 
In Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, Prince Edward Island, Northwest Territories, 
Nunavut and Yukon, individual investors cannot invest more than $10,000 in a single issuer unless 
the investor is an eligible investor, which is defined in terms similar to the accredited investor 
definition, but with considerably lower net income, financial asset and net asset requirements. 
Ontario has its own unique investment caps.160
Other provincial differences exist. In addition, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Yukon do not 
allow any commissions or finder’s fees to be paid to any person, other than to a registered dealer.
2. Rationales Underlying the OM Exemption
The OM exemption cannot easily be justified under any single rationale, although the capital 
raising and capital gap rationales are probably the best fit. Those provinces and territories that have 
investment caps that depend on whether or not the investor is an eligible investor appear to have 
drawn inspiration from the sophisticated investor rationale, although it is difficult to imagine that 
those who qualify as eligible investors are truly sophisticated.
159 
The only material difference appears to be the failure to include “a person who is not the public” as an eligible purchaser in 
the FFBA exemption.
160 
See OSC “Backgrounder: Exempt Market Review,” Nov. 5, 2015, 2.
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The overlay of investor protections clearly invokes the investor protection rationale. However, it is 
clear that the OM exemption is not purely motivated by investor protection. Rather, it is more a case 
of facilitating capital raising subject to an investor protection constraint.
F. The Crowdfunding Exemption
1. How it Works
The crowdfunding exemption, like the OM exemption, is described in the table below.161
Type of Issuer s.1 (definition of eligible 
crowdfunding issuer)
Issuer must be incorporated or organized in Canada, with the head office in Canada, 
a majority of directors resident in Canada, and principal operating subsidiary (if any) 
incorporated or organized in Canada or the U.S.
-no blind pools or investment funds 
Type of Security s.1 (definition of eligible security) -common shares
-non-convertible preference shares
-securities convertible into either of the above
-non-convertible debt securities linked to a fixed or floating interest rate
-units of a limited partnership
-flow-through shares under the ITA
Maximum 90-Day Distribution 
Period
ss.5(1)(a)
Total Proceeds ss.5(1)(b) $1.5 million in 12-month period
Investment Limits Ontario: ss.5(1)(c)
Other: ss.5(1)(d)
ONTARIO NON-ACCREDITED INVESTORS
-$2,500 per distribution
-$10,000 total in calendar year
ONTARIO ACCREDITED INVESTORS WHO ARE NOT PERMITTED CLIENTS
-$25,000 per distribution
-$50,000 for all distributions in calendar year
ONTARIO PERMITTED CLIENT
-unlimited
ALL OTHER JURISDICTIONS: NON-ACCREDITED INVESTOR
-$2,500 per distribution
ALL OTHER JURISDICTIONS: ACCREDITED INVESTOR
-$25,000 per distribution
Issuer May Use Only a Single 
Registered Funding Portal
ss.5(1)(e)
Point-of-Sale Mandatory 
Disclosure by Issuer
ss.5(1)(f), 12 1. Offering Document 
-mandatory representations
-right of withdrawal
-contractual right of action
2. Term Sheet
3. Video “other materials summarizing the information in the crowdfunding offering 
document”
Point-of-Sale Mandatory 
Disclosure by Portal of All Fees 
Charged to Issuer or Purchaser
s.35 “A funding portal must include on its online platform prominent disclosure of all 
compensation, including fees, costs and other expenses that the funding portal may charge 
to, or impose on, an eligible crowdfunding issuer or a purchaser.”
Generic and Dealer-Specific 
Point-of-Sale Cautions by Portal
s.33 -the distribution has not been reviewed or approved in any way by a securities regulatory 
authority or regulator
-the distribution is risky and may result in the loss of all or most of an investment
-there will be limited ongoing disclosure
-if the portal is a restricted dealer, they are not required to provide suitability advice
-if they are an investment dealer or an exempt market dealer, they are required to provide 
suitability advice
Forbidden Use of Proceeds ss.5(2)(a) Cannot be used to “invest in, merge with or acquire an unspecified Business”
161 
MI 45-108 (applying in Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia). In Manitoba, the pertinent instrument is 
Blanket Order 45-502 (“Start-up Crowdfunding Prospectus and Registration Exemption”); in Saskatchewan, General Order 
45-929 (“Start-up Crowdfunding Registration and Prospectus Exemptions”). The references in column two of the table are 
to MI 45-108.
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Non-Compliant Prior User ss.5(2)(b) Previously relied on CF exemption but is not in compliance with ongoing obligations (and, if 
reporting issuer, not in compliance with reporting obligations under securities law)
Closing Conditions s.6 -right of withdrawal has expired
-minimum proceeds have been raised
-issuer has received risk disclosure statements
Representations by Issuer ss.7(1) REPORTING ISSUER
-no misrepresentation
NON-REPORTING ISSUER
-no untrue statement of a material fact
CERTIFICATE SIGNING REQUIREMENTS
-in Appendix A of 45-108
-CEO, CFO, any two directors, promoters
-different personnel for other kinds of issuers
Right of Withdrawal s.8 Within 48 hours after the purchase agreement is signed
Contractual Right of Rescission 
and Damages
s.9 REPORTING ISSUERS
-misrepresentation
NON-REPORTING ISSUERS
-untrue statement of material fact
No Advertising by Issuer s.11 But may inform purchasers through portal that it is making an offering
No Advertising by Portal ss.24(1), (2)
No Commissions or Fees s.13
No Lending to Purchasers s.14
File Report of Exempt Offering 
With Regulators
s.15
Continuous Disclosure s.16 (financial statements)
s.17 (annual statement of use of 
proceeds)
s.18 (notice of specified key 
events)
NON-REPORTING ISSUER YEAR-END FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
-complete set of financial statements for previous year (and year before, if they exist) 
delivered to regulator and made available to purchasers, within 120 days after end of  
fiscal year
-if previously raised $250,000-$750,000 under prospectus exemptions, then must be 
review engagement
-if previously raised $750,000 or more, audit engagement
REPORTING ISSUER FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
-silent on this, but usual standards would apply
USE OF PROCEEDS
-accompanies year-end financial statements
NOTICE OF SPECIFIED KEY EVENTS (ON, NS, MB)
-discontinuation of the issuer’s business
-change in the issuer’s industry
-change of control of the issuer
Risk Acknowledgment Form
Resale Restrictions NON-REPORTING ISSUER
-can only be resold under a prospectus exemption or a prospectus
REPORTING ISSUER
-four-month hold period
Bookkeeping and Records s.20 NON-REPORTING ISSUERS
-specified records
PORTALS
RESTRICTED DEALER 
FUNDING PORTAL
61
A Restricted Dealer Can Only be 
Registered in the Crowdfunding 
Category
s.1 (definition of restricted dealer 
funding portal)
“restricted dealer funding portal means a person or company that
(a) is registered in the category of restricted dealer under National Instrument 31-103 
Registration Requirements, Exemptions and Ongoing Registrant Obligations,
(b) is authorized under the terms and conditions of its restricted dealer registration to 
distribute securities under this Instrument,
(c) acts or proposes to act as an intermediary in a distribution of eligible securities through 
an online platform in reliance on the crowdfunding prospectus exemption, 
(d) is not registered in any other registration category, and
(e) in Ontario, is not an affiliate of another registered dealer, registered adviser or registered 
investment fund manager.”
Except in Ontario, a Restricted 
Dealer Can be Affiliated With 
Another Dealer
s.1 (definition of restricted 
dealer)
See immediately above.
Restricted Dealers Can Only Do 
Crowdfunding
s.41 IN COMPLIANCE WITH MI 45-108
-see s.41, and see immediately above
IF PURSUANT TO A DISCRETIONARY ORDER
-“except in Ontario, a [restricted dealer can engage in a] distribution of securities made 
in reliance on a start-up crowdfunding registration and prospectus exemptive relief order 
granted by a securities regulatory authority or regulator, provided that the restricted dealer 
funding portal and a registered individual of the restricted dealer funding portal are in 
compliance with the terms, conditions, restrictions and requirements in this Instrument.”
Many of the Key Registration 
Requirements Do Not Apply
s.21 -some carve-outs from NI 31-103, including
 -most education and proficiency requirements
 -requirement to belong to an SRO
 -suitability obligation
-regulator may specify other terms, conditions, restrictions or requirements
Nebulous Proficiency 
Requirement
s.43 “43. (1) A restricted dealer funding portal must not permit an individual to perform an 
activity in connection with a distribution under the crowdfunding prospectus exemption 
unless the individual has the education, training and experience, which may include 
appropriate registration [but cannot be registered in another category], that a reasonable 
person would consider necessary to perform the activity competently, including 
understanding the structure, features and risks of the distribution.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the obligation to understand the structure, features 
and risks of the distribution does not include any obligation to assess
(a) the merits or expected returns of the investment to purchasers, or
(b) the commercial viability of the proposed business or distribution.”
Cannot Provide Advice Re 
Purchase of Security or Re 
Borrowing to Buy Security 
s.39
See below
Cannot Designate a Chief 
Compliance Officer Unless 
Certain Tests Met
s.42
See below
REGISTERED DEALER 
FUNDING PORTAL
s.22 -must be registered in one or other of existing categories, plus requirements specific to 
funding portals
Suitability Obligation for 
Investment Dealer or Exempt 
Market Dealer
s.22, ss.33(c)
ALL PORTALS
No connection with issuer s.23 -portal, plus affiliates and officer, director, significant shareholder, promoter or control 
person, cannot own more than 10 per cent of the voting securities of the issuer
Must Ensure That Issuer 
Information is Fairly Presented
ss.24(3) -“A funding portal must ensure that the information about an eligible crowdfunding issuer 
and a distribution of eligible securities of the issuer is presented or displayed on its online 
platform in a fair, balanced and reasonable manner.”
Must Have Issuer Access 
Agreement With Issuer
ss.24(1), s.26 MUST HAVE SPECIFIED TERMS
-issuer will comply with portal’s policies and procedures
-all posted material will be factually supported, with no promotional statement, 
misrepresentation or an untrue statement of a material fact or otherwise be misleading
-both portal and issuer responsible for compliance with securities laws
-business will be conducted with integrity
ONTARIO
-confirm that the portal is the agent of the issuer for the distribution
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Must Conduct Background 
Checks
s.25 PERSONAL INFORMATION FORMS
-“obtain a personal information form from each director, executive officer and promoter of 
the issuer”
BACKGROUND CHECKS ON ISSUER AND VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS
-conduct or arrange for background checks on issuer and each director, executive officer 
and promoter of the issuer
Must Review All Disclosure 
Material
ss.27(1) -all disclosure material
-must order issuer to correct any incorrect, incomplete or misleading disclosure
Must Review Information 
Documents and Background 
Checks
ss.27(1) -PIFs (personal information forms)
-background checks
Denial of Access and 
Termination
s.28 -portal must deny access if various tests are met, including:
  -the business may not be conducted with integrity
  -non-compliance with rules
   -disclosure contains a misrepresentation (reporting issuers) or an untrue statement of 
material fact (non-reporting issuers)
   -“the issuer or any of its directors, executive officers or promoters has pled guilty to or has 
been found guilty of an offence related to or has entered into a settlement agreement in a 
matter that involved fraud or securities violations.”
Return of Funds s.29 RETURN OF FUNDS IF:
-the purchaser exercises its right of withdrawal
-the requirements set out in section 6 (Conditions for closing of the distribution) are not met
-the issuer withdraws the distribution
-the distribution is otherwise terminated
Notification of Amended 
Offering Document
s.30 -notify each purchaser if an amended offering document becomes available 
Removal of Distribution 
Materials
s.31 -immediately, if distribution withdrawn
Monitor Purchaser 
Communications
s.32 -if purchasers can post communications, monitor these to ensure that such statements are 
not at odds with the crowdfunding document or at odds with 45-108
Must Obtain Documents from 
Purchaser
s.34 -risk acknowledgment form
-“except in Ontario, confirm and validate that the purchaser is an accredited investor if the 
acquisition cost is greater than $2,500,”
-“in Ontario, obtain from the purchaser, and validate, a confirmation of investment limits 
form.”
Must Deliver Documents to the 
Issuer
s.36 -the purchase agreement entered into between the issuer and the purchaser
-a risk acknowledgment form from the purchaser 
-except in Ontario, confirmation and validation that the purchaser is an accredited investor, 
if the acquisition cost is greater than $2,500
-in Ontario, a confirmation of the investment limits form for the purchaser
Point-of-Sale Mandatory 
Disclosure by Portal of All Fees 
Charged to Issuer or Purchaser
See above
Generic and Dealer-Specific 
Point-of-Sale Cautions by Portal
See above
Release of Funds to Issuer s.37 -only when “the requirements set out in section 6 [Conditions for closing of the distribution] 
have been met”
Twice Yearly Reports to the 
Regulators of All Financings, etc.
s.38 -all completed distributions
-all non-completed distributions
-all those denied access to the portal
No Advice by Restricted Dealer s.39 “(a) to purchase securities under the crowdfunding prospectus exemption or in connection 
with any other trade in a security, or
(b) to use borrowed money to finance any part of a purchase of securities under the 
crowdfunding prospectus exemption or in connection with any other trade in a security.”
Restriction of Referral 
Arrangements
s.40 -portal cannot enter into a referral arrangement
-however, can compensate a third party for a referral
Cannot Designate a Chief 
Compliance Officer Unless 
Certain Tests Met
s.42 “(a) passed the Exempt Market Products Exam or the Canadian Securities Course Exam,
(b) passed the PDO Exam or the Chief Compliance Officers Qualifying Exam, and
(c) gained 12 months of experience and training that a reasonable person would consider 
necessary to perform the functions of a chief compliance officer for a restricted dealer 
funding portal.”
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Restricted Dealer Proficiency s.43 43. (1) A restricted dealer funding portal must not permit an individual to perform an 
activity in connection with a distribution under the crowdfunding prospectus exemption 
unless the individual has the education, training and experience, which may include 
appropriate registration, that a reasonable person would consider necessary to perform 
the activity competently, including understanding the structure, features and risks of the 
distribution.
For the purposes of subsection (1), the obligation to understand the structure, features and 
risks of the distribution does
(2) not include any obligation to assess
(a) the merits or expected returns of the investment to purchasers, or
(b) the commercial viability of the proposed business or distribution.
DISCRETIONARY EXEMPTIONS s.44 ROC
-can be granted by the securities regulatory authority (i.e., staff)
ONTARIO
-can only be granted by the regulator
2. Rationales Underlying the Crowdfunding Exemption
The crowdfunding exemption is Canada’s response to the U.S. Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
Act (or JOBS Act) signed into law in April 2012162 and made effective by the SEC in May 2016. 
It is clearly designed to facilitate funding by small businesses, subject to the extensive investor 
protection constraints indicated above.
162 
See “Bill Summary & Status” - 112th Congress (2011 - 2012) - H.R.3606 - All Congressional Actions - THOMAS (Library 
of Congress); “The JOBS Act: Encouraging Startups, Supporting Small Businesses.” https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
blog/2012/04/05/jobs-act-encouraging-startups-supporting-small-businesses. Retrieved May 28, 2017..
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APPENDIX B
SECURITIES REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT PROCESS
 
Source: Canadian Securities Administrators Enforcement Report for 2015, 10.
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APPENDIX C
ORDERS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
127. (1) The Commission may make one or more of the following orders if in its opinion it is in the 
public interest to make the order or orders:
 1.  An order that the registration or recognition granted to a person or company under Ontario 
securities law be suspended or restricted for such period as is specified in the order or be 
terminated, or that terms and conditions be imposed on the registration or recognition.
 2.  An order that trading in any securities by or of a person or company or that trading in any 
derivatives by a person or company cease permanently or for such period as is specified in 
the order.
 2.1  An order that the acquisition of any securities by a particular person or company is 
prohibited permanently or for the period specified in the order.
 3.  An order that any exemptions contained in Ontario securities law do not apply to a person or 
company permanently or for such period as is specified in the order.
 4.  An order that a market participant submit to a review of his, her or its practices and 
procedures and institute such changes as may be ordered by the Commission.
 5.  If the Commission is satisfied that Ontario securities law has not been complied with, an 
order that a release, report, preliminary prospectus, prospectus, return, financial statement, 
information circular, take-over bid circular, issuer bid circular, offering memorandum, proxy 
solicitation or any other document described in the order,
  i. be provided by a market participant to a person or company,
  ii. not be provided by a market participant to a person or company, or
  iii. be amended by a market participant to the extent that amendment is practicable.
 6.  An order that a person or company be reprimanded.
 7.  An order that a person resign one or more positions that the person holds as a director or 
officer of an issuer.
 8.  An order that a person is prohibited from becoming or acting as a director or officer of any 
issuer.
 8.1  An order that a person resign one or more positions that the persons holds as a director or 
officer of a registrant.
 8.2  An order that a person is prohibited from becoming or acting as a director or officer of a 
registrant.
 8.3  An order that a person resign one or more positions that the person holds as a director or 
officer of an investment fund manager.
 8.4  An order that a person is prohibited from becoming or acting as a director or officer of an 
investment fund manager.
 8.5  An order that a person or company is prohibited from becoming or acting as a registrant, as 
an investment fund manager or as a promoter.
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 9.  If a person or company has not complied with Ontario securities law, an order requiring the 
person or company to pay an administrative penalty of not more than $1 million for each 
failure to comply.
 10.  If a person or company has not complied with Ontario securities law, an order requiring the 
person or company to disgorge to the Commission any amounts obtained as a result of the 
non-compliance.  
Terms and conditions
(2)  An order under this section may be subject to such terms and conditions as the Commission 
may impose.
67
APPENDIX D
FUNDING OPTIONS FOR HIGH-TECH VERSUS NON-HIGH-TECH FIRMS
A. Industry Canada 2012 Study
A study of the funding of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) published by Industry 
Canada in 2012163 states:
In 2011, 36 percent of SMEs requested some type of external financing, with 26 percent 
requesting debt, 7 percent requesting leasing, 8 percent requesting trade credit, 4 percent 
requesting government financing and 2 percent requesting equity financing.
Chartered banks were the main suppliers of financing to SMEs in 2011, serving 55 percent of 
financing requests, followed by credit unions or Caisses populaires (16 percent), government 
institutions (7 percent), leasing companies (4 percent), family and friends (2 percent), venture 
capital funds or angel investors (1 percent) and foreign banks (0.4 percent).
The following table, also taken from the study, shows that when SMEs apply for loans, they are 
rarely turned down. Indeed, even the smallest SMEs in the Industry Canada sample (one to four 
employees) have an 88.4 per cent approval rate.
 
These figures suggest that for SMEs external funding is most often bank funding — and that when 
SMEs apply for bank funding, they usually get it. Moreover, only two per cent of the SMEs in the 
sample were interested in external equity funding. 
These figures, however, tell far from the whole story. The Industry Canada sample is limited to 
firms already generating revenues.164 That will exclude virtually all high-tech (HT) startups,  
since these typically engage in an extended period of research and development during which  
no revenues are earned.165 Moreover, HT firms often lack collateral, which is almost always a 
163 
See http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/eng/02776.html. 
164 
The Industry Canada summary of the report states:
    The target population for the survey was private sector, for-profit, SMEs employing between one and 499 employees and 
generating between $30,000 and $50 million in annual revenues in 2011. 
 Ibid.
165 
See e.g., Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Legal and Institutional Barriers to Financing Innovative Enterprise in Canada, Discussion 
Paper 94-10 (Summer, 1994), Government and Competitiveness Project, School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University; Paul 
Toriel, Financing the New Economy: Towards a Positive Conspiracy: Businesses, Financial Institutions, and Government 
Partners in a Stronger Canada (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1994).
68
requirement to secure a bank loan. This lends further support to the view that the Industry Canada 
sample is dominated by non high-tech (NHT) firms.166
The Industry Canada data are consistent with the standard paradigm of small firm funding for 
NHT firms. Such firms will tend to rely initially on the resources of the entrepreneur, family and 
friends to get off the ground. Once these firms are earning revenue and have accumulated assets to 
be used as collateral (often supplemented by personal guarantees), they will then often seek bank 
financing (as did 26 per cent of Industry Canada’s sample firms). 
Also consistent with the standard paradigm of NHT firms, relatively few firms in the sample sought 
external equity financing. Angel investors invest far less often in NHT firms than HT firms; such 
investors seek potentially high-growth, high-return endeavours, and these are heavily concentrated 
in the HT arena. 
As noted in more detail below, all of these sources of financing typically drawn upon by NHT 
firms are accommodated under existing law. Funding from family, friends and business associates 
will be obtainable under either the private issuer exemption or the FFBA exemption. Bank 
financing is explicitly excluded from the purview of securities regulation and thus requires no 
prospectus exemption.167
B. Industry Canada 2015 Study
A further Industry Canada study published in 2015 is broadly consistent with the view that 
Industry Canada’s SME data are dominated by NHT firms. Table A (taken from the study) 
indicates the relative frequency with which different sources of funding are used by startup 
businesses. The most common source of financing is “personal financing used towards your 
business” — i.e., the entrepreneur’s own funds. The second most common is “credit from financial 
institutions” and the third “financing from friends or relatives of business owner(s).”
A relatively small number of startup firms — 1.8 per cent — used either angel or venture capital 
financing, although for firms with 100-499 employees, the figure rises to 4.2 per cent. It is difficult 
to know what to make of this, however, since angel and venture capital financing, two quite 
different forms of funding, are lumped together. Small firms seeking seed or startup funding are 
likely to receive funding from angels but not venture capitalists, while larger firms with customers 
and revenue tend to rely on venture capitalists for expansion capital, and not angel investors. In any 
case, the meager reliance of firms in the sample on external equity again suggests that Industry 
Canada’s data are dominated by NHT firms.
Table B shows sources of financing used to start up a high-tech business. While it is not entirely 
clear why it segregates “information and communications technologies” from “knowledge-based 
industries”, the sources of financing are very similar for each. The data show that for high-tech firms:
a) The use of credit financing is far more modest;
b) The use of retained earnings is lower;
c) The use of trade credit from suppliers is far more modest;
d) The use of capital leasing is far more modest;
e) There is a greater reliance on angel and venture capital investing.
166 MacIntosh, Ibid; Toriel, Ibid.
167 See e.g., Ontario Securities Act, 1(1) (definition of “security”, part e).
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All of this is consistent with the standard paradigm of funding sources for HT firms. HT firms will 
typically not be able to borrow funds (whether from banks, trade suppliers or via capital leasing), 
will not have retained earnings to draw upon, and will rely to a greater extent than NHT firms on 
angel and venture capital financing.
 
 
C. Prospectus Exemptions and NHT Firms
For NHT firms, many of the most prevalent forms of financing do not fall within the reach of the 
prospectus requirement and so no prospectus exemption is required. This includes borrowing from 
credit institutions, the entrepreneur’s personal financing, retained earnings, trade credit, capital 
leasing, and government loans, grants, subsidies and non-repayable contributions. 
A relatively small number of financing options involve the sale of a security and hence attract the 
requirement to either prepare a prospectus or identify an applicable prospectus exemption. This 
includes financing from friends, family and business associates, and (rarely) angels and venture 
capitalists. However, the current menagerie of prospectus exemptions is well crafted to suit these 
types of financings. The private issuer and FFBA exemptions cover most equity financing needs. 
The accredited investor exemption will accommodate those rare cases in which venture capital is 
drawn upon, and probably most angel investments as well. 
That these investments are easily accommodated under current law does not, however, suggest 
that NHT firms will never abuse the exemptions. The private issuer exemption, for example, 
employs a number of categories whose meaning is subject to a wide range of interpretations. Who, 
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for example, is a “close personal friend” or a “close business associate”? These categories could 
easily be abused by firms raising money, and, particularly as there will rarely be a regulated market 
intermediary involved in the financing, abusers will only be held to account if things turn out 
poorly and one or more investors complain to the regulators or file a civil suit.
Similarly, those who are investing may misrepresent themselves as accredited investors when 
in fact they are not. The issuer may or may not make genuine efforts to determine if these 
representations are correct. Indeed, as discussed in the main body of the text, the sale of securities 
nominally made under the accredited investor exemption, but in fact made to non-qualifying 
purchasers, is one of the most common cases dealt with by both IIROC and the securities 
regulators.
D. The Jenkins Report
Figure 1, taken from the federally commissioned Jenkins Report,168 indicates the spectrum of 
financing options available to HT firms. Clearly, HT firms draw upon many of the same funding 
sources as NHT firms. Starting at the left, the only difference between HT and NHT firms at 
the seed stage is the availability of government funding for HT firms. Once the firm begins 
commercialization, like NHT firms HT firms draw upon the entrepreneur’s own resources and 
those of family, friends and business associates to finance their operations. In so doing, they use the 
same exemptions noted above (the private issuer exemption and the FFBA exemption).
FIGURE 1 FUNDING CHAIN BY STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT AND SIZE OF INVESTMENT
 
Source: Jenkins Report, Figure 7.1
After this early stage, one primary difference between HT and NHT funding sources is the 
conspicuous absence of bank (or other debt) financing for HT firms. This is reflective of the widely 
held view that, because of a high degree of information asymmetry, high risk, lack of cash flow and 
lack of collateral, bank financing (and other debt options) will rarely be available.
168 
“Innovation Canada: A Call to Action,” See http://rd-review.ca/eic/site/033.nsf/vwapj/R-D_InnovationCanada_Final-eng.
pdf/$FILE/R-D_InnovationCanada_Final-eng.pdf.
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The other difference is the heightened dependence of HT firms on angel investors, who are not 
usually accommodated under the private issuer or FFBA exemptions. As noted in the main body of 
the text, it is thus important that the threshold that qualifies retail investors as accredited not be set 
too high. In other words, in this context, it would seem that a different balance between type I and 
type II errors is appropriate. That is, type I errors (false positives) are comparatively less costly, and 
type II errors (false negatives) more costly.
Reinforcing this argument, HT firms make a contribution to the economy that is relatively great 
compared to NHT firms. The Jenkins Report hammers home a number of vital facts pertaining 
to Canada’s economic future. First, the central determinant of economic performance is labour 
productivity. Second, labour productivity is largely a function of innovation, which is the province 
of HT firms. Third, Canada is not only doing poorly in the global innovation sweepstakes, but 
increasingly poorly over time.
With respect to the importance of innovation, the Jenkins Report states:169
The material standard of living of a society depends on productivity — the value of goods 
and services produced per hour of work. A high level of employment is clearly important, and 
favourable movements in the world prices of a country’s exports — for example, certain natural 
resources in Canada’s case — can boost prosperity, at least for a time. But over the long run, it 
is labour productivity growth that drives increases in average per capita incomes and business 
competitiveness. Productivity growth, in turn, is primarily the result of innovation.
With respect to Canada’s flagging success in the innovation derby, the Jenkins Report indicates 
that, relative to the U.S., Canadian productivity has been falling steadily since the 1980s:170
Canada has a business innovation problem. The most telling indicator is Canada’s subpar 
productivity growth, which has averaged a mere 0.6 percent over the 2000-2009 period, or 
less than half the average of 1.5 percent for all OECD countries (OECD productivity database, 
accessed November 2010). Relative to the United States (US), as depicted in Figure 2.1, labour 
productivity in Canada’s business sector has fallen from approximately 93 per cent of the US 
level in 1984 to 71 per cent in 2009 — a quarter-century of relative decline that cannot be 
explained by temporary or one-time factors.
The Jenkins Report is far from unique in recognizing that innovation lies at the hub of our future 
prosperity. Indeed, the premier importance of spurring innovation has become something of a 
mantra to the governments of nearly every industrialized nation on the planet. To the extent that 
the prospectus exemptions make an important contribution to the health of our HT firms, it is 
important that the rules not be overly restrictive.
169 
P. 2-1.
170 
P. 2-3. Figure 2.1, which graphically illustrates Canada’s slippage relative to the U.S., is reproduced as Appendix A.
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